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he terrorist attacks of September 11th undoubtedly ushered in a new
era in international security affairs. Although terrorism has been a
tragically prominent feature of the global condition for most of the past half
century, these operations were quantitatively and qualitatively different than
those of the past. They involved extensive and sophisticated long-term plan-
ning by a group that cuts across lines of nationality and which operates from
within many countries.2 The scale of the destruction in both human and physi-
cal terms was shocking; the fact that the attacks and their aftermath were
broadcast live only served to further exacerbate their psychological impact.
1. Professor of International Law, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies,
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The views expressed herein are those of the author in his
personal capacity and do not necessarily represent those of any United States or German
government agency.
2. For an excellent discussion of how the attacks were a turning point in the evolution of
international terrorism, see Paul J. Smith, Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model:
Confronting New Realities, PARAMETERS, Summer 2002, at 33. See also, Michael Howard, What’s
in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism, FOR. AFF’S, January/February 2002, at 8, which argues that
declaring a “war” on terrorism was a “terrible and irrevocable error.” Id. at 8.
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That all 19 terrorists directly involved executed them with great precision de-
spite the certainty of their own deaths may well portend a terrifying face of 21st
century terrorism—a genre of terrorism likely to prove extraordinarily difficult
to counter by traditional means.
Combating this aggravated form of terrorism will require new cooperative
security strategies. Certainly, the Global War on Terrorism articulated by the
United States represents one such strategy.3 As time passes and opportunities
and threats become clearer, the worldwide war on terrorism will evolve re-
sponsively. Other governments and intergovernmental organizations are al-
ready developing parallel and complimentary strategies.
Lest the lawlessness inherent in terrorism spread to its victims, counter-
terrorism strategy must be formulated with great sensitivity to the international
law governing the use of force. Some have suggested that this body of law, in-
cluding that facet regarding the right to self-defense, is not up to the task.4
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3. The extent to which the GWOT represents a fundamental shift in US strategies for dealing
with threats is apparent in President Bush’s discussion of preemptive strategies. See Remarks by
the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, June 1, 2002,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (Jun. 18, 2002).
Released on September 17, 2002, the US National Security Strategy incorporates such strategies.
See U.S. National Security Strategy, at 4, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
(Nov. 4, 2002).
4. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 539 (2002). Professor Glennon argues
that:
The international system has come to subsist in a parallel universe of two systems, one
de jure, and the other de facto. The de jure system consists of illusory rules that would
govern the use of force among states in a platonic world of forms, a world that does not
exist. The de facto system consists of actual state practice in a real world, a world in
which states weigh costs against benefits in regular disregard of the rules solemnly
proclaimed in the all-but-ignored de jure system. The decaying de jure catechism is
overly schematized and scholastic, disconnected from state behavior, and unrealistic in
its aspirations for state conduct.
Id. at 540.
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Others counter that effective responses to terrorism and state “supporters”
thereof are proving entirely consistent with existing prescriptive norms.5 This
article explores those norms, specifically the relevant jus ad bellum,6 in the con-
text of the response to the 9/11 attacks. Under what circumstances can a victim
state react forcibly to an act of terrorism? Against whom? When? And with
what degree of severity? It concludes that a natural evolution in the community
understanding of limitations on the use of force has occurred over the past de-
cades, such that claims of international law’s present insufficiency are over-
blown. However, assertions that the law as traditionally understood supports a
full range of forceful responses to terrorism equally overstate reality. As is usu-
ally the case, the truth lies between the extremes.
The Relevant Facts
In order to effectively appraise the international law governing the use of force
in counter-terrorism today, and to acquire a sense for its normative vector, it is
necessary to first paint the factual backdrop. Law tends to be reactive and re-
sponsive to the factual context in which it operates. Obviously, this is the case
for customary international law, which relies, inter alia, on state practice for its
emergence. The same is true, however, for convention-based law. Despite dec-
larations that international agreements, such as the UN Charter, should be in-
terpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of their text, it is
undeniable that community understanding of law shifts over time to remain
9
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5. See, e.g., Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under
International Law, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 559 (2002).
[T]he case for America’s forcible response to the September 11 attacks as being fully
consistent with the inherent right of self-defense under customary international law and
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is very strong. The unanimous condemnation of the
attacks by the U.N. General Assembly, the affirmation of the right of self-defense by the
Security Council, the growing consensus in the international community to hold states
accountable for terrorist actions, and the repeated condemnation by the Security
Council of the Taliban Regime’s support of terrorists in particular, clearly help establish
an appropriate framework under international law for the exercise of self-defense by the
United States.
Id. at 589–90.
6. That component of international law that governs when it is that a state may resort to force in
pursuit of its national interests, such as defending itself from armed attack.
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coherent and relevant to both current circumstances and the global commu-
nity’s normative expectations.7
Sadly, the facts of 9/11 are all too familiar. On 11 September 2001, terror-
ists seized control of four passenger aircraft in the United States. Two were
flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a
third was driven into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. and the fourth
crashed in Pennsylvania following an unsuccessful attempt by passengers to
regain control from the highjackers. Roughly 3000 people of over 80 national-
ities perished.
Investigation quickly led authorities to focus their attention on Osama bin
Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist organization.8 Al Qaeda operates from more
than 60 countries through a compartmentalized network using operatives of
numerous nationalities. By October, the British government felt sufficiently
confident in intelligence reports at its disposal to release certain facts and con-
clusions regarding the group. These were subsequently confirmed by the
United States. Specifically, 10 Downing Street announced that al Qaeda had
planned and conducted the attacks, that it continued to have the resources to
mount further operations, that US and UK citizens were potential targets and
that “Usama Bin Laden and Al-Qa’ida were able to commit these atrocities
10
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7. Pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and
purpose . . . ;
2. There shall be taken into account together with the context: . . .
b. any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. . . .
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969). This point was reiterated by the International Court of Justice in Competence of the
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations. There, the Court noted “the
first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to
endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which
they occur.” 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8.
8. For background on bin Laden, see PETER L. BERGEN, HOLY WAR, INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET
WORLD OF OSAMA BIN LADEN (2001); Michael Dobbs, Bin Laden: Architect of New Global
Terrorism, WASH. POST, Sep. 16, 2001, at A8.
E:\BLUE BOOK\VOL 79 TERROR\VENTURA FILES\VOL 79 BB TERROR 11_18_03.VP
Thursday, April 28, 2005 8:21:09 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
because of their close alliance with the Taleban regime, which allowed them
to operate with impunity in pursuing their terrorist activity.”9
Of particular relevance to the use of force issue is the fact that al Qaeda was
hardly venturing into terrorism for the first time on September 11th. The or-
ganization had allegedly been involved in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (at-
tacks for which Osama bin Laden has been indicted10), and the attack on the
USS Cole in 2000; the group had also claimed responsibility for the 1993 at-
tack on US special forces in Somalia, as well as three separate 1992 bombings
intended to kill US military personnel in Yemen. Moreover, the US Depart-
ment of State alleges the existence of al Qaeda ties to plots (not executed) to
kill the Pope, attack tourists visiting Jordan during the millennium celebra-
tion, bomb US and Israeli embassies in various Asian capitals, blow up a dozen
passenger aircraft while in flight and assassinate President Clinton.11
That al Qaeda represents a continuing threat is apparent not only from its
track record, but also from statements periodically issued by Osama bin Laden
himself. The British government’s October Press Release cited a number of his
most virulent:
The people of Islam have suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice
imposed by the Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators . . . . It is the
duty now on every tribe in the Arabian peninsula to fight jihad and cleanse the
land from these Crusader occupiers. Their wealth is booty to those who kill
them. (1996)
[T]errorising the American occupiers [of Islamic Holy Places] is a religious and
logical obligation. (1996)
We—with God’s help—call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to
be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill Americans and plunder their
money whenever and wherever they find it. We also call on Muslims . . . to
Michael Schmitt
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9. United Kingdom Press Release, 10 Downing Street Newsroom, Responsibility for the Terrorist
Atrocities in the United States, Oct. 4, 2001, at paras. 21–22, available at http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=2686 (Jun. 18, 2002). As to US confirmation of the facts, see
David E. Sanger, White House Approved Data Blair Released, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2001, at B6.
10. Indictment, United States v. Usama bin Laden et al., S(2) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
4, 1998).
11. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, app. B: Background Information on
Terrorist Groups, al-Qa’ida, April 30, 2001, available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/
2000/2450.htm (Jun. 18, 2002).
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launch the raid on Satan’s US troops and the devil’s supporters allying with
them, and to displace those who are behind them. (1998)
[A]cquiring [chemical or nuclear] . . . weapons for the defence of Muslims [is] a
religious duty. (1998)
Thus, in al Qaeda we have a determined terrorist organization that has com-
mitted multiple acts of terrorism over the course of a decade—acts which re-
sulted in the deaths of thousands and caused property and financial damage
measured in the billions of dollars—and views its continuing campaign in terms
of jihad.
The US reaction was swift. Within a week, President Bush formally pro-
claimed a national emergency12 and called up members of the reserve compo-
nent of the armed forces.13 He also established the Office of Homeland Secu-
rity and the Homeland Security Council in order to facilitate a coordinated
response to the terrorist threat.14 For its part, Congress passed a joint resolution
that authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, autho-
rized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, orga-
nizations or persons.”15 Essentially, the United States was placed on a war foot-
ing. Indeed, the President characterized the attacks as “an act of war against
our country.”16 Thus, the US government quickly moved beyond a criminal
law enforcement paradigm in determining how to respond to the attacks.
Almost immediately, the spotlight focused on Taliban connections to
al Qaeda, which was “headquartered” in Afghanistan. Although the United
12
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12. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sep. 18, 2001).
13. Exec. Order No. 13,223, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,201 (Sep. 18, 2001). A number of other steps were
taken. For instance, President Bush gave the Treasury Department greater power to undermine
financial support for terrorism through freezing assets and imposing financial sanctions on those
who refused to cooperate in the effort. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23,
2001).
14. Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 10, 2001).
15. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
16. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United
States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347
(Sep. 20, 2001).
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States did not formally recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of
the country, the Taliban controlled the greatest amount of territory, including
that where al Qaeda was based.17 Working through the Pakistani government,
which maintained diplomatic relations with the Taliban, the United States is-
sued a series of demands. These were set forth publicly in late September dur-
ing a Presidential address to a joint session of Congress. Specifically, the
United States insisted that the Taliban:
Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of Al-Qa’ida who hide in
your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have
unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in
your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp
in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist and every person in their support
structure to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to
terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.18
President Bush made it quite clear that there would be no negotiation and that
he expected immediate compliance. Moreover, he unambiguously laid out the
consequences of non-compliance: “They will hand over the terrorists, or they
will share in their fate.”19
Despite the “no-negotiations” stance, the Taliban expressed a desire to re-
solve the matter. These entreaties were rebuffed and on October 6 the Presi-
dent issued a final public warning to cooperate.20 The following day the
United States and United Kingdom launched the first phase of Operation EN-
DURING FREEDOM, consisting of airstrikes against both al Qaeda and Taliban
targets. The scope and nature of the campaign quickly expanded to encom-
pass ground and maritime operations.
Michael Schmitt
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17. For background on the Taliban, see AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL
AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA (2001); PETER MARSDEN, THE TALIBAN: WAR,
RELIGION AND THE NEW ORDER IN AFGHANISTAN (1998).
18. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. President George W. Bush, Radio Address, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1429, 1430
(Oct. 6, 2001).
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As required by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the United States
promptly notified the Security Council that it was acting in individual and col-
lective self-defense.21 In the report, the United States asserted that it had
“clear and compelling information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is
supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the at-
tacks” and that there was an “ongoing threat” made possible “by the decision
of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be
used by [al Qaeda] as a base of operations.” The purpose of the military opera-
tions was to “prevent and deter further attacks on the United States.” Omi-
nously, the United States warned, “We may find our self-defense requires
further actions with respect to other organizations and other States.”22 In an
address to the nation, the President echoed the threat contained in the Arti-
cle 51 notification: “Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there
is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of in-
nocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will
take that lonely path at their own peril.”23
Because it had participated in the strikes, the United Kingdom also trans-
mitted the requisite report to the Security Council. It announced that the at-
tacks were conducted in self-defense against “Usama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda
terrorist organization and the Taliban regime that is supporting it.” The
avowed purpose was “to avert the continuing threat of attacks from the same
source.”24 Thus, although limiting the scope of its operations to al Qaeda and
14
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21. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51. Article 51 provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
22. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Oct. 7, 2001), U.N. Doc. S/2001/
946, available at http://www.un.int./usa/s-2001-946.htm (Jun. 18, 2002) [hereinafter US Letter].
23. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaeda
Training Camps and Taliban Military Installations, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1432, (Oct.
7, 2001).
24. Letter from the Charge d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council (Oct. 7, 2001) available at http://www.ukun.org/xq/asp/SarticleType.17/Article_
ID.328/qx/articles_show.htm (Jun. 18, 2002).
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the Taliban, like the United States it suggested that action was necessary to
prevent further attacks.
The international reaction to the affair was almost universally one of outrage
over the terrorist acts and support for the United States. On September 12th,
the Security Council passed Resolution 1368 condemning the attacks as “horri-
fying,” labeling them a threat to international peace and security, and reaffirm-
ing the “inherent right of self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the
United Nations.”25 Resolution 1373, passed on September 28th, likewise cited
the right to self-defense and laid out steps to combat terrorism, such as suppress-
ing the financing of terrorism, denying safe haven to terrorists and their accom-
plices, and cooperating in law enforcement efforts.26 Interestingly, the General
Assembly did not refer to self-defense in its own resolution on the attacks.27
Following commencement of the military campaign, the Security Council
passed a number of relevant resolutions. For instance, on November 14th it is-
sued Resolution 1378, which expressed support for “international efforts to
root out terrorism, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations”; reaf-
firmed Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (which had cited the right to self-defense);
condemned the Taliban for “allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the
export of terrorism by the Al Qa’ida network and other terrorist groups and
for providing safe haven to Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qa’ida and others associ-
ated with them”; and expressed support for the “efforts of the Afghan people
to replace the Taliban.”28 On December 20th it passed Resolution 1386,
which (as with Resolution 1373) expressed support for rooting out terrorism
in accordance with the Charter, reaffirmed Resolutions 1368 and 1373, and
15
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25. S. C. Res. 1368, pmbl., U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess, U.N. Doc. S/1378/(2001). It is interesting
that the Security Council did not reference self-defense in response to the 1998 attacks on the
East African embassies even though the United States formally invoked Article 51. According to
Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has cognizance over “any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and decides upon measures necessary to “maintain or
restore international peace and security.” U.N. CHARTER, art. 39. Therefore, labeling the acts as
a threat to international peace and security is normatively significant in that it empowers the
Council to act.
26. S. C. Res. 1373, pmbl. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).
27. G.A. Res. 56/1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 8 (Sep. 18, 2001).
28. S. C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1378/(2001).
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authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force
[ISAF].29 Reaffirmation of the international counter-terrorist effort, of previ-
ous resolutions, of its prior condemnation of the Taliban and al Qaeda and of
the fact that terrorism constitutes a threat to international peace and security
occurred yet again on January 20th, 2002 with Resolution 1390.30 In it, the Se-
curity Council employed its Chapter VII authority to impose sanctions on the
Taliban and al Qaeda, including a freezing of assets, a prohibition of travel and
an arms embargo.
In none of the resolutions did the Security Council explicitly authorize the
United States, any coalition of forces, or a regional organization to use force
pursuant to Article 42 of the Charter, as the Council is entitled to do in the
face of a “threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.”31 How-
ever, it is important to note that the Security Council twice referred to the in-
herent right to individual and collective self-defense prior to coalition combat
operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda, that no effort was made to con-
demn the forceful response once launched, and that the Council repeatedly
reaffirmed the right to self-defense and expressed support for the international
effort to “root out terrorism” as those operations were ongoing.
Beyond the United Nations, the most powerful military alliance in the
world articulated its position in even more unequivocal terms. The day after
the terrorist attacks, NATO’s North Atlantic Council, consisting of Perma-
nent Representatives of all 19 NATO member states, announced that if the
attacks originated from outside the United States, they would be “regarded as
16
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29. S. C. Res. 1386 U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1386/(2001). Pursuant to the
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement of Dec. 5, 2001), ISAF is to assist in
maintenance of security in the vicinity of Kabul. ISAF executed a military technical agreement
(MTA) with the Interim Administration in Afghanistan on 4 January 2002. For the text of the
Bonn Agreement, see http://www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm (Jun. 18,
2002). The MTA text is at http://www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta.pdf (Jun. 18, 2002).
30. S. C. Res. 1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1390/(2002). The operation itself is
described by the British Ministry of Defence at http://www.operations.mod.uk/fingal/ (Jun. 18,
2002).
31. U.N. CHARTER, art. 42. The text reads:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.
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an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”32 Article 5, based
on Article 51 of the UN Charter, provides for collective self-defense if any of
the member states suffers an “armed attack.”33 Within three weeks, and fol-
lowing briefings in which US officials provided “clear and compelling” evi-
dence that the attacks were not the work of domestic terrorists, the North
Atlantic Council made precisely that finding and invoked Article 5.34 There
was no mention of whom the defense, which began five days later, could be di-
rected against. This was a normatively significant omission given that one of
the entities the United States and United Kingdom struck on October 7th was
a non-state actor, whereas the other was a government supportive of that
group, but which did not control it.
Similarly, the Organization of American States invoked the collective self-
defense provisions of the Rio Treaty35 following its finding that “these terrorist
attacks against the United States are attacks against all American States.”36
Australia did likewise, citing Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty in offering to
17
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32. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Press Release No. 124, statement by the
North Atlantic Council (Sep. 12, 2001) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-
124e.htm, (Jun. 18, 2002).
33. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual
or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
North Atlantic Treaty, Aug. 24, 1959, art. 5, T.I.A.S. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
34. Secretary General Lord Robertson, statement at NATO Headquarters (Oct. 2, 2001)
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm, (Jun. 18, 2002).
35. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an
American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and,
consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting
the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sep. 2, 1947, art. 3.1, 62 Stat. 1681, 21
U.N.T.S. 77.
36. Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Resolution 1, Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs Acting as Organ of Consultation In Application of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, OEA/Ser.F/II.24, RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sep. 21, 2001).
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deploy military forces.37 Russia, China and India agreed to share intelligence
with the United States, while Japan and South Korea offered logistics support.
The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations
with the Taliban, and Pakistan agreed to cooperate fully with the United
States. Twenty-seven nations granted overflight and landing rights and 46
multilateral declarations of support were obtained.38
Once the campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban began, offers or ex-
pressions of support flowed in from many sources. The United Kingdom, as
noted, participated directly in the initial strikes, whereas many other states,
such as Georgia, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, provided airspace and facilities. China,
Egypt, Russia and the European Union publicly backed the US/UK opera-
tions. The Organization for the Islamic Conference simply urged the United
States to limit the campaign to Afghanistan,39 while the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation Forum condemned terrorism of all kinds. Neither organi-
zation criticized the operations. Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom offered ground troops.40 By May 2002, the forces of several
nations, in particular sizable British, Australian, Canadian and American con-
tingents, were engaged in dangerous “mop-up” actions.41
18
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37. Prime Minister John Howard, Government Invokes ANZUS Treaty—Press Conference (Sep.
14, 2001), available at http://australianpolitics.com.au/foreign/anzus/01-09-14anzus-invoked.shtml,
(Jun. 18, 2002). See also White House, Fact Sheet: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
Overview (Oct. 1, 2001) available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2001/5194.htm (Jun. 18,
2002). Article VI of the ANZUS Treaty provides: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in
the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes.” Security Treaty (Australia, New Zealand, United States), Sep. 1, 1951, art. IV, 3
U.S.T. 3420, 3422, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, 84.
38. Fact Sheet, supra note 37.
39. See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 41, 49 (2002); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 96 AM. J. INT’L. LAW 237, 248 (2002).
40. Murphy, Contemporary Practice 2002, supra note 39, at 248. The European Council
“confirm[ed] its staunchest support for the military operations . . . which are legitimate under the
terms of the United Nations Charter and of Resolution 1368.” Declaration by the Heads of State
of Government of the European Union and the President of the Commission: Follow-up to the
September 11 Attacks and the Fight Against Terrorism, Oct. 19, 2002, SN 4296/2/01 Rev. 2.
41. Perhaps best illustrative of the coalition nature of the campaign were operations that month
from Manas airport, near Bishket, Kyrgyz Republic. Although typically a sleepy airfield, it was
hosting US and French fighter-bombers; Australian and French tankers; transport aircraft from
Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway; and a South Korean medical team. Americans in
a Strange Land, THE ECONOMIST, May 4, 2002, at 41.
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Since the counter-terrorism operations began, controversy has surfaced re-
garding a number of legal issues. Most notable among these has been the de-
tention, treatment and proposed prosecution of the detainees held at US
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay. Also a point of contention, albeit more muted,
is the extent of collateral damage and incidental injury from the strikes con-
ducted against al Qaeda and Taliban targets. And looming on the horizon is a
very divisive issue, i.e., carrying the fight beyond the borders of Afghanistan.
Yet, except in legal circles, and particularly the sub-circle of academia, there
has been minimum controversy about the lawfulness of the operations con-
ducted within Afghanistan under the jus ad bellum. On the contrary, and as
illustrated in the events described above, support for the US and coalition
military response has been strong. The extent to which this support is
grounded in either the lex lata or lex ferenda is the subject of the remainder of
this article.
The Normative Framework for the Use of Force
The UN Charter expresses the basic prohibition on the use of force in interna-
tional law. It provides, in Article 2(4), that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”42 Within the four corners of the
Charter, there are but two exceptions to this prohibition. The first, set forth in
Article 39, empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of a
threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression and decide what mea-
sures are necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. By
Article 42, the Council may turn to military force to resolve these situations in
what are generally labeled “enforcement operations.”43 States would provide
troops under a UN flag, as a coalition of the willing or individually. Regional
Michael Schmitt
19
42. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4). On this article, see Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2, in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 72 (Bruno Simma ed., 1995).
43. U.N. CHARTER, art. 42.
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organizations are also authorized to engage in “enforcement” activities, but
only with the approval of the Security Council.44
The second exception is found in Article 51. It provides
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Thus, states victimized by an armed attack may not only defend themselves,
but also receive assistance from others in mounting that defense. They need
not await a Council authorization to act, but are required to report actions
taken to the Security Council, which may itself determine that it needs to re-
spond in some fashion.
Some commentators assert that additional exceptions to the prohibition on
the use of force lie outside the Charter. Most frequently cited is a right to hu-
manitarian intervention, a topic rendered timely by NATO’s 1999 interven-
tion in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on behalf of the Kosovar
Albanians.45 However, no such purported exception, or at least none that has
20
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44. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of
the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as
defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional
arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state,
until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be
charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 53.1.
45. On this issue, see Adam Roberts, The So-Called ‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 Y.B.
INT’L HUM. L. 3 (2000).
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garnered any significant support, would apply in the case of counter-terrorist
operations.46
Despite the seeming expansiveness of the Charter prohibition, there has
been, as will be discussed, growing support for, or at least a diminishing degree
of criticism of, forceful counter-terrorist operations. Tellingly, they are almost
always justified in terms of the right to self-defense, rather than as an excep-
tion to the general prohibition on the use of force. Perhaps more normatively
significant is the fact that acceptance by other states of their legitimacy, when
expressed, is also usually framed in self-defense terms. Thus, while it is appar-
ent that such activities are increasingly acceptable politically, it is more appro-
priate to consider that acceptance as bearing on the evolution of the norms
regarding self-defense, than as exemplars of an emergent exception to a prohi-
bition generally characterized as comprehensive in nature.
Returning to the Charter, a more apropos inquiry is whether counter-
terrorist operations can fall within the Chapter VII enforcement framework.
That international terrorism may constitute a threat to international peace
and security, as understood in the Charter use of force context, is unquestion-
able. For instance, in 1992 the Security Council, reacting to attacks against
Pan Am Flight 103 (the Lockerbie case) in 1988 and UTA Flight 722 the fol-
lowing year, affirmed “the right of all states . . . to protect their nationals from
acts of international terrorism that constitute threats to international peace
and security” and expressed concern over Libya’s failure to fully cooperate in
establishing responsibility for the acts.47 The same year, and in response to
Libya’s failure to render the requisite cooperation, the Council re-emphasized
that “suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which
States are directly or indirectly involved, is essential for the maintenance of
21
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46. It has been suggested that the Article 2(4) prohibition does not apply in any event to limited
strikes against terrorists based in another country. Such operations, so the reasoning goes, do not
“violate the territorial integrity or political independence” of the state in which they occur since
they are not directed against that state’s personnel or property, are not intended to affect its
political independence in any way, and are limited temporally to the period necessary to
eradicate the terrorist threat. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, And The Use Of
Military Force, 18 WIS. INT’L L. J. 145, 166–67 (2000), citing, inter alia, Jordan J. Paust,
Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 711, 716–7 (1986); JOHN
NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 131 (1990); LOUIS HENKIN, HOW
NATIONS BEHAVE 141–45 (1979); Jean Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine,
Human Rights and International Law, in RIGHT V. MIGHT 25–33 (Council on Foreign Relations
1989). This article rejects the approach, favoring, as discussed infra, one that acknowledges an
infringement on sovereignty, but balances it against other state rights.
47. S. C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/731/(1992).
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international peace and security.” It further reaffirmed that “in accordance
with the principle in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter . . . every State has
the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when such acts in-
volve a threat or use of force.” Finally, the Council styled the failure of Libya
to cooperate a threat to international peace and security.48
Similarly, following the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-
Salaam, the Security Council condemned “such acts which have a damaging
effect on international relations and jeopardize the security of States.” As it
did in 1992, the Council also reiterated the duty to refrain from “organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acqui-
escing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commis-
sion of such acts.”49 The following year, the Council approved Resolution
1269 (1999), which, without being tied to any particular incident,
“[u]nequivocally condemn[ed] all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as
criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and
manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, in particular those
which could threaten international peace and security.”
Indeed, the Security Council characterized the pre-September 11th situa-
tion in Afghanistan as one implicating international peace and security. In
October 1999, it “strongly condemn[ed] the continuing use of Afghan terri-
tory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training
of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts, and reaffirm[ed] its conviction that
the suppression of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance of
international peace and security.”50 It did precisely the same in December
2000. In July 2001, the Council made its position completely unambiguous by
determining that “the situation in Afghanistan constitutes a threat to interna-
tional peace and security in the region.”51 By September 2001, therefore, it
was abundantly clear that international terrorism, as well as allowing one’s
territory to be used as a base of terrorist activities, could rise to the level of a
“threat to the peace.” This being so, the Council is entitled, pursuant to
Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law
22
48. S. C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/748/(1992).
49. S. C. Res. 1189, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1189/(1998). See also S. C. Res. 1044,
U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1044/(1996) regarding assassination attempts against the
President of Egypt, which styled “the suppression of acts of international terrorism . . . an
essential element for maintenance of international peace and security.”
50. S. C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1267/(1999).
51. S. C. Res. 1363, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1363/(2001).
E:\BLUE BOOK\VOL 79 TERROR\VENTURA FILES\VOL 79 BB TERROR 11_18_03.VP
Thursday, April 28, 2005 8:21:10 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Article 39, to decide on the appropriate measures to take to “maintain or re-
store international peace and security,” and such measures include the use of
force.
In the aftermath of the attacks, the Security Council labeled them threats
to the peace. On September 12, 2001, it “[s]trongly condemn[ed] in the
strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on September
11, 2001 in New York, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania and, regard[ed]
such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international
peace and security.”52 On September 28, it did so again in nearly identical lan-
guage.53 Meeting at the ministerial level on November 12, 2001, the Council
issued Resolution 1377, in which it declared “that acts of international terror-
ism constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and secu-
rity in the twenty-first century.”54 In subsequent resolutions on the situation
in Afghanistan, it adopted the practice of reaffirming all previous resolutions,
thereby continuing to characterize the September 11 attacks, as well as any
other act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and se-
curity. Such a finding is the sine qua non of an authorization for a forceful re-
sponse pursuant to Chapter VII (with the exception of self-defense).
Thus, it is unquestionable that the Security Council could have elected to
mount enforcement operations—either under the UN banner or by granting a
mandate to member states or an intergovernmental organization—in an effort
to restore and maintain international peace and security.55 Since the demise of
the Cold War, the Council has not hesitated to exercise its enforcement au-
thority, sometimes in quite creative fashion. Chapter VII enforcement opera-
tions have been conducted in response to such diverse situations as the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, the failed-state disorder in Somalia, fighting resulting
from the breakup of Yugoslavia and internal violence in Indonesia. It has
even, in the case of Operation DENY FLIGHT, authorized a regional security
organization, NATO, to maintain a no-fly zone. And when that same organi-
zation mounted Operation ALLIED FORCE to stop human rights abuses against
the Kosovar Albanians by forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ad
23
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52. S. C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1368/(2001).
53. S. C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).
54. S. C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1377/(2001). In the resolution, it
adopted the Declaration on the Global Effort to Counter Terrorism.
55. For an article arguing that there is “a continuing process of attempting to widen customary
rights while eroding the effective powers of international organizations,” of which Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM is an excellent example, see Eric P.J. Myjer and Nigel D. White, The Twin
Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?, 7 J. CONF. & SEC. L 5 (2002).
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bellum-based criticism of the bombing centered on the fact that the NATO
members had not turned to the Council for authorization to conduct their hu-
manitarian intervention, rather than on the operation itself. Perhaps best il-
lustrative of the flexibility with which the Council has interpreted its Chapter
VII authority is creation of international tribunals to try those charged with
human rights and humanitarian law violations during both international and
non-international armed conflicts.56
In fact, the Security Council has used its Chapter VII authority to respond
to terrorism in the past by imposing sanctions on both Libya and Sudan for al-
lowing terrorist organizations to operate from their territory.57 Yet the Secu-
rity Council was never asked to issue a mandate in response to the 9/11
attacks and in no resolution did it do so. Although some commentators have
searched for an implied use of force authorization in the post-attack Security
Council resolutions,58 such efforts are unnecessary. There was no reason for
the Council to issue one. The sole basis for conducting Coalition operations
was self-defense, which does not require advance Council authorization. All
the Charter requires is notice whenever such activities are undertaken. By the
terms of Article 51, an operation in self-defense does not deprive the Council
of its “right” to respond to the situation, but, by the same token, that fact does
not deprive states of their inherent right to exercise individual or collective
self-defense, a form of armed self-help.59
24
Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law
56. See, e.g., Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, available at http://
www.un.org/icty/index.html (Jun. 18, 2002) [established by S. C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/827/(1993)]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ (Jun. 18, 2002) [established by S. C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/955/(1994)]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html (Jun. 18, 2002) [established by S. C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR,
55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1315/(2000)]. Note that the authority of the Council to establish such
tribunals was unsuccessfully challenged in an interlocutory appeal before the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Court for Yugoslavia. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-T,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 10, 1995). See George H. Aldrich, Comment: Jurisdiction Of The
International Criminal Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 64 (1996).
57. S. C. Res. 748 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/748/(1992) (Libya); S. C. Res. 1054,
U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1054/(1996) (Sudan).
58. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Addendum: Security Council Resolutions 1377 (2001) and 1378
(2001), ASIL Insights, Dec., 2001, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (Jun. 18, 2002).
59. Report of the International Law Commission, 32d Sess., II(2) Y. B. INT’L L. COMM. 1, 54
(1980).
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Self-Defense
As noted, Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 cited the inherent right
to self-defense in the specific context of international terrorism. Further, both
the United States and the United Kingdom notified the Security Council that
they were conducting operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda pursuant to
their right of individual and collective self-defense. They received verbal and
actual support from an array of states and intergovernmental organizations,
and there was no significant criticism of either the general premise that states
may respond to international terrorism in self-defense or of its invocation in
this particular case. However, the operations that have been mounted against
the Taliban and al Qaeda raise a number of issues regarding the precise (or not
so precise) parameters of the right to self-defense and the nature of its evolu-
tion. Before turning to them though, it is useful to survey several of those sur-
rounding self-defense generally.60
One involves ascertaining whether an action constitutes an “armed at-
tack,” for under Article 51 the right to defend oneself surfaces only in the face
of such an attack. Not all uses of force rise to this level. For instance, it is argu-
able that certain operations that do not involve physical force, such as a com-
puter network attack, might be a “use of force” [and thereby contrary to
Article 2(4)], but not an “armed attack.”61 Similarly, the International Court
25
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60. One important issue is whether or not Article 51 represents the entire body of the law of self-
defense. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice held that the customary
international law right of self-defense “continues to exist alongside treaty law,” specifically
Article 51 of the Charter. To begin with, the article itself refers to the “inherent right” of
individual and collective self-defense. More to the point in this inquiry is the fact that Article 51
leaves unanswered certain aspects of its exercise. As the Court pointed out, for instance,
although Article 51 sets a threshold of “armed attack” for vesting of the right, there is no
definition of that term. The Charter also fails to articulate the well-accepted requirements that
acts of self-defense be proportional and necessary. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 176 [hereinafter
Nicaragua]. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion),
I.C.J. Reports 1996, para. 41 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. Customary international law can
prove useful in filling voids in the understanding of self-defense. This fact renders the current
campaign normatively significant in that pervasive state practice over time, when the product of
a sense of legal obligation, matures into received customary international law. The Afghanistan
operations therefore represent important data points in the development of the right of self-
defense.
61. See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law:
Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 896 (1999).
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of Justice, applying customary international law, held in the Nicaragua case
that:
the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed
bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its scale
and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere
frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces. But the Court
does not believe that the concept of “armed attack” includes only acts by armed
bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels in
the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support. Such
assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention
in the internal or external affairs of other States.62
It is therefore the “scale and effects” of the act that are determinative in as-
sessing whether an armed attack is taking place such that a right to respond in
self-defense vests. By the Court’s standard, acts of a “significant scale” suffice.
That said, the Court’s reference to a mere frontier incident, as well as the ac-
ceptance of actions by other than a state’s armed forces, imply that the requi-
site significance of the scale and effects is rather low. Border incidents are
characterized by a minimal level of violence, tend to be transitory and spo-
radic in nature, and generally do not represent a policy decision by a state to
engage an opponent meaningfully. They are usually either “unintended” or
merely communicative in nature. By negative implication, it would not take
much force to exceed this threshold.
It is possible, then, that a state employing violence will have “used force,”63
and in doing so committed an international wrong, or even engaged in activity
constituting a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression
(thereby allowing the Security Council to take cognizance of the matter under
Chapter VII), but not have conducted an armed attack as that term is
Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law
26
62. Nicaragua, supra note 59, para. 195 (emphasis added).
63. Note that Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force applies only to states.
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understood normatively in the context of self-defense.64 Analogously, actions
by non-state actors (the applicability of self-defense in such situations is dis-
cussed infra) might be criminal in nature and/or represent threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, but not be of a scale suffi-
cient to implicate the international law right of self-defense. Despite the gaps,
however, it would appear that the level of violence necessary to rise to the
level of an armed attack is markedly low.
Once an armed attack has been launched, the victim state may respond
with force in self-defense. However, customary international law imposes cer-
tain requirements on self-defense. In the 19th century Caroline case, Secretary
of State Daniel Webster set out the standard that has since achieved nearly
universal acceptance. According to Secretary Webster, there must be a “ne-
cessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation” and the defensive acts must not be “unrea-
sonable or excessive.”65 This standard has matured into the requirements that
self-defense be necessary and proportionate. The International Court of Jus-
tice confirmed their existence in both the Nicaragua case66 and the Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion.67 In the latter case, the Court noted “this dual
27
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64. In ascertaining whether an armed attack has occurred, resort is sometimes made to the term
“aggression,” which was defined in General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression Resolution.
However, aggression is not wholly synonymous with armed attack. As Randelzhoffer has noted,
The travaux preparatoires of the Definition illustrate that a definition of ‘armed attack’
was not intended. In the special committee that worked out the Definition, the United
States, supported by other Western states, strongly opposed tendencies to include the
‘armed attack’. [Cf the statements made by the US representative (U.N. Doc. A/
AC.134/S. C. 113, S. C. 105, p. 17 and S. C. 108, p. 43), the representative of Japan
(U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/S. C. 112), and the UK (U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/S. C. 113)]. Like
the Soviet Union [see stmt by the Soviet Representative (U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/S. C.
105, p. 16)], they also expressed the view that the notions of ‘act of aggression’ and
‘armed attack’ are not identical [see the statement by the US representative (U.N. Doc.
A/AC.134/S. C. 105, p. 17)].
Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 661, 668 (Bruno Simma ed., 1995).
65. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN
STATE PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1840–1).
66. Nicaragua, supra note 60, para. 176.
67. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 60, para. 41. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 905 (1987). Ian Brownlie labels
proportionality “the essence of self-defence.” IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE BY STATES 279 n. 2 (1963).
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condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter,” thereby verifying the
applicability of the requirements in both customary and conventional law.68
The principle of necessity requires that the resort to force occur only when
no other reasonable options remain to frustrate continuation of the armed at-
tack. Obviously, directly reacting with force to an armed attack that is under-
way would seldom be deemed unnecessary. More normatively complex is the
situation where an armed attack has taken place, but for some reason has
paused. Perhaps it has achieved its intended objectives. Or cooler heads may
have prevailed in the attacking state’s government. Maybe the government
that ordered the attack has been ousted and a successor government opposed
to the conflict is now in power. Whatever the case, necessity mandates other
than forceful responses whenever feasible.
Transposing the standard to terrorism, the question is generally whether
law enforcement operations are likely to be sufficient to forestall continuation
of the armed attack. Such operations may be undertaken by the victim state,
the state where the terrorists are based, or, for that matter, any other state.
Similarly, if a state in which the terrorists are located conducts military opera-
tions with a high probability of success, there would be no necessity basis for
self-defense by the victim state.
The proportionality principle simply requires that the response in self-
defense be no more than necessary to defeat the armed attack and remove the
threat of reasonably foreseeable future attacks. Yet, it is sometimes wrongly
suggested that the size, nature and consequences of the response must be pro-
portional to the size, nature and consequences of the armed attack. As to the
size of the attack, it would be absurd to suggest that there must be an equiva-
lency of force between the armed attack and self-defense. On the contrary,
the attacker typically seizes the initiative, thereby acquiring an advantage. To
successfully defend against an opponent enjoying such an advantage may take
much greater force than that used to mount the attack.
Requiring equivalency of nature is equally inappropriate. The International
Court of Justice suggested as much by implication in its Nuclear Weapons opin-
ion. When assessing the proportionality of the use of nuclear weapons, the
Court opined that “(t)he proportionality principle may . . . not in itself exclude
28
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68. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 60, para. 41.
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the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense in all circumstances.”69 While rep-
resenting a non-decision on the issue at hand, the Court had admitted the
possibility that use of a nuclear weapon might be legitimate in the face of a
non-nuclear attack. Scaled down from the nuclear level, such a criterion re-
mains equally malapropos. By way of illustration, in responding to a maritime
attack the most productive tactic may be to disrupt land-based maritime com-
mand and control assets. Likewise, in an effort to cause an attacker to desist by
altering his cost-benefit calculations, it may be more effective to concentrate
on targets of particular value to him rather than those directly involved in the
attack.70 In fact, doing so may well result in a lesser level of violence than
would be necessary to definitively defeat the attacking units themselves.
Surely international law does not mandate tit-for-tat exchanges.
At first glance, a standard of proportionality vis-à-vis the harm caused (or
possible) to the victim might seem more reasonable. In other words, the state
engaging in self-defense should not be entitled to cause more harm than it has
suffered. But such a standard ignores the fact that international law grants
states the right to self-defense in order that they not be rendered helpless in
the face of an attack. To suggest that a state cannot use the destructive force
necessary to cause an attacker to discontinue (or to prevent future attacks)
because the resulting destruction outweighs that the victim state originally
suffered is to effectively deprive the victim of the right to self-defense.
Finally, there have been suggestions that self-defense operations are dispro-
portionate if they cause more collateral damage and incidental injury than the
civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects originally suffered by the vic-
tim state. Such assertions have been made in the context of the current
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69. Id., para. 42. There are, as noted in the discussion of self-defense, competing views of
proportionality. India argued that the principle meant a nuclear weapon could not be used
except in response to a nuclear attack. But even in such a case, so India argued, the use of nuclear
weapons would be malum in se. Thus, any nuclear reprisal would be unlawful. Written statement
of the Government of India, June 20, 1995 (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons),
at 2–3. Other approaches include proportional to the harm caused, vice technique employed to
cause the harm, and proportional to the force needed to cause the other side to desist. Compare
the approach of the Netherlands and United States, both of which argued that the legality would
be situational, with that of India. Observations of the Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, June 16, 1995 (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons), at 12; Written
statement of the Government of the United States of America, June 20, 1995 (Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons), at 30.
70. In a slightly different context, this approach lies at the heart of compellance strategies. On
the issue of affecting an enemy’s decision-making, see Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the
Façade: A Critical Look at the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force
Doctrine, 51 A. F. L. REV. 143 (2001).
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counter-terrorist operations, in which the number of civilian casualties alleg-
edly exceeds the number of fatalities resulting from the 9/11 attacks.71 Claims
of this nature confuse the self-defense proportionality requirement of the jus
ad bellum with the jus in bello proportionality principle that forbids attacks
“expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in re-
lation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”72 But even
by the in bello standard, the correct phenomena to compare are incidental in-
juries/collateral damage and military advantage. The issue is whether or not the
military advantage accruing from an attack justifies the civilian casualties and
damage to civilian objects; there is no balancing of the civilian suffering on the
opposing sides of the conflict.
Restated in the context of terrorism, the proportionality standard allows
only that degree of force necessary to fend off a terrorist attack and protect
oneself from a future continuation thereof. But the force necessary to achieve
this purpose may far exceed that employed in the attack. Terrorists often op-
erate in loose networks from dispersed locations, receiving logistic support in
ways intended to mask their nature. Further, they may be fanatical devotees
willing to die for their cause; this makes it extremely difficult to meaningfully
affect their cost-benefit calculations. Taking them on is a daunting task that
typically requires extremely aggressive measures.
Beyond necessity and proportionality, the Caroline standard has also often
been deemed to impose an imminency requirement, i.e., that the attack be
ongoing, or at least so imminent that the victim state has to react almost re-
flexively to counter it. This requirement has generated enormous debate
about precisely when it is that an attack becomes imminent enough to merit
30
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71. Estimates of civilian casualties vary widely. Compare, e.g., Marc W. Herold, A Dossier on
Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting, Dec.
10, 2001, available at http://www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm (Jun. 18, 2002)
(approximately 4000 by Jan. 1, 2002) with Carl Connetta, Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a
Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties, Jan. 18, 2002, available at http://www.comw.org/pda/
0201oef.html#ref7 (Jun. 18, 2002) (1000–13000 over the same period). A Human Rights
Watch Report is forthcoming on the subject (unreleased as of Jun. 19, 2002).
72. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, arts. 51.5(a) & 57.2(a)(iii) & (b), Dec.
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD
GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 419 (3d ed. 2000). On proportionality, see
William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol Additional I in Conventional Warfare, 98
MIL. L. REV. 91 (1982); Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM.
J. INT’L L. 391 (1993).
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“pre-emptive” action in self-defense. This is the issue of the appropriateness of
“anticipatory self-defense.”73
Certain commentators who read Caroline narrowly suggest a high standard
of imminence.74 Such a reading logically flows from Webster’s “instant, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation” ver-
biage. However, the nature of combat has evolved dramatically since the time
of the Caroline correspondence. In the 21st century, the means of warfare are
such that defeat can occur almost instantaneously. Indeed, the linear blitz-
krieg strategies of the Second World War appear slow and unwieldy by today’s
standards, in which the battlespace is four-dimensional and effects are gener-
ated in fractions of a second.
In such an environment, the most apropos approach is to concentrate on
the underlying intent of the right to self-defense. Its primary purpose is to af-
ford states a self-help mechanism by which they may repel attackers; it recog-
nizes that the international community may not respond quickly enough, if at
all, to an armed attack against a state. Yet, the limitations of necessity, propor-
tionality and imminency play to the community’s countervailing aversion to
the use of violence by states. Thus, there is a balancing between the state’s
right to exist unharmed and the international community’s need to minimize
the use of force, which is presumptively destabilizing.
The most responsive balance between these two interests lies in permitting
a use of defensive force in advance of an attack if “the potential victim
must immediately act to defend itself in a meaningful way and if the poten-
tial aggressor has irrevocably committed itself to attack.”75 This standard
combines an exhaustion of remedies component with a requirement for a rea-




73. Yoram Dinstein has rejected the terminology “anticipatory” in favor of “interceptive” on the
basis that the former term suggests that preventive actions in the face of a “foreseeable” armed
attack are legitimate. For Professor Dinstein, the question is whether or not the “other side has
committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way.” As he explains, “[t]he
crucial question is who embarks upon an irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the
Rubicon. This, rather than the actual opening of fire, is what casts the die and forms what may be
categorized as an incipient armed attack. It would be absurd to require that the defending state
should sustain and absorb a devastating (perhaps a fatal) blow, only to prove an immaculate
conception of self-defence.” YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 172
(3rd ed. 2001).
74. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1634–35 (1984).
75. Schmitt, supra note 61, at 932.
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However, what if an attack is “complete” at the time of the proposed re-
sponse in self-defense? To some extent, this question bears on the necessity
requirement; the termination of the initial action may allow for other than
forceful resolution of the situation, thereby rendering a use of force in self-
defense unnecessary. But the query also touches upon the imminency require-
ment. Must defense against a future attack be measured by the same standard
of imminency as defense against an initial one?
The answer is “yes,” but the mere fact that an entity has attacked once
makes it easier to conclude that it will do so again. After all, the “potential” at-
tacker’s mens rea has now been tangibly demonstrated. Much more to the
point, it may also be reasonable to conclude that the first attack was part of an
overall campaign that in itself constitutes a single extended armed attack. By
this understanding, an after-the-fact reaction to an initial attack constitutes a
response to an on-going armed attack in which there is but a tactical pause.
The approach reflects the reality of combat, in which pauses are the norm, not
the exception. They may be necessary for logistical purposes, as a result of
weather, due to enemy responses, pending acquisition of further intelligence,
to leverage surprise, etc. The question is whether the attack that has occurred
is part and parcel of a related series of acts that will continue to unfold.
Treating a series of actions as a unitary whole makes particular sense in the
context of terrorism. Terrorist campaigns generally consist of a series of ac-
tions that occur periodically over extended periods of time. Moreover, given
their nature, they are very difficult to defend against while underway—the
potential target is usually only revealed by the attack itself, all of society repre-
sents a potential target thus rendering effective on-the-spot defense problem-
atic, the actual violence may occur after the terrorists have left the scene (as
in a bombing), the terrorists may be willing to die in the attack, and the iden-
tity and location of the terrorists may not be uncovered until after the com-
pletion of a particular action. In fact, in the majority of cases it is only after
the attack that the victim state can mount its response. Therefore, unless one
is willing to deny victim states a consequential right of self-defense against
terrorists, it is reasonable to interpret self-defense as permitting the use of
force against terrorists who intend, and have the capability to, conduct fur-
ther attacks against the victim. By this interpretation, it is not the imminency
of an isolated action that is relevant, but rather the relationship between a se-
ries of attacks. Once the first of the related attacks has been launched, the
question becomes whether the victim state has sufficient reliable evidence to
conclude that further attacks are likely, not whether those further attacks are
themselves imminent.
32
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Self-Defense Against al Qaeda
“Armed attacks” by terrorists. That the attacks of 9/11 were of sufficient “scale
and effects” to amount to an armed attack is tragically self-evident. However,
the self-defense operations launched against the al Qaeda terrorist network in
Afghanistan raise a number of other interesting issues. The first is whether an
“armed attack” can be carried out by a terrorist group or, stated conversely,
whether self-defense can be conducted against one.
Some commentators have suggested that until 9/11, the understanding of
self-defense against an armed attack was essentially limited to aggression by
states.76 But Article 51 makes no mention of the nature of the entity that must
mount the attack that in turn permits a forceful response in self-defense. This
omission is particularly meaningful in light of the fact that Article 2(4)’s pro-
hibition on the use of force specifically applies only to actions by Members of
the United Nations, all of which are states. That one key provision on the use
of force [2(4)] includes a reference to states, whereas another (51) does not,
implies that the latter was not meant to be so limited. This distinction makes
sense in the Charter context. The Charter was meant to govern state behav-
ior, but in doing so it both limits what states may do and empowers them.
Thus, in 2(4) it restricts a state’s resort to force, but in 51 authorizes it to use
force in the face of armed attack. It would make no sense to limit the authori-
zation to attacks by states because at the time the Charter was drafted, that
was the greater threat.
Article 39 is similarly devoid of reference to state action when charging the
Security Council with responsibility for deciding on the measures to take in
the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. In
the various resolutions regarding the events of 9/11 (and those resulting from
it), the Council characterized the situation as a threat to international peace
and security. Moreover, it specifically noted that as a general matter terrorism
constituted such a threat. While Article 39 does not directly address self-
defense and armed attacks, both it and Article 51 fall within Chapter VII,
which is entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Considering these related points vis-à-vis
33
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76. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
International Law, European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum, available at http://
www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-cassese.html (Jun. 18, 2002). See also Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense
Was There an “Armed Attack”?, European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum,
available at http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-gaja.html (Jun. 18, 2002).
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Articles 39 and 51, it is reasonable to conclude that the entire chapter deals
with actions that threaten international peace and security, whatever the
source.
Moreover, recall that Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which
both cited the inherent right of self-defense, were issued before the counter-
terrorist campaign began and at a time when suspicion was focused on an in-
ternational terrorist group as the culprit. In particular, recall that Resolution
1368 passed the very day after the attack, when no one was discussing the pos-
sibility that a state may have been behind the actions. This indicates that the
Council’s understanding of self-defense includes defending against armed at-
tacks by non-state actors.
State practice in the aftermath of 9/11 further supports the applicability of
self-defense to acts by non-state actors. No voices were raised claiming that ei-
ther the customary right of self-defense or Article 51 was limited to the con-
text of state actions. On the contrary, there were very visible illustrations,
such as NATO’s invocation of Article V for the first time in its existence, of
the fact that most states viewed 9/11 as an armed attack meriting actions in
self-defense; in no case was there any suggestion that the right was dependent
on identifying a state as the attacker. Lest there be any question on this point,
once the self-defense actions commenced against both a state and a non-state
actor on October 7th, the dearth of controversy over using self-defense
against non-state actors persisted.77 In fact, post-October 7th Security Coun-
cil resolutions went so far as to urge member states to “root out terrorism, in
keeping with the Charter of the United Nations.”78
Necessity and the impact of law enforcement alternatives. It is interesting to
note that support for using force was widely evident despite the fact that a log-
ical alternative to self-defense existed—criminal law enforcement.79 After all,
the September 11th terrorist acts constituted a variety of criminal offences un-
der the laws of a number of jurisdictions. Because it allows for universal
34
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77. Ireland’s Ambassador to the United Nations, who was acting as President of the Security
Council, noted the unanimous support of the Council following the briefing on the United
States’ and United Kingdom’s operations in self-defense. Christopher S. Wren, U.S. Advises U.N.
Council More Strikes Could Come, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at B5.
78. S. C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1378/(2002); S. C. Res. 1386, U.N.
SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1386/(2001); S. C. Res. 1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/1390/(2002). Specific reference was made to Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network
in the January resolution.
79. For a pre 9/11 discussion of the alternatives, and the appropriateness of each, see Walter
Gary Sharp, The Use of Armed Force Against Terrorism: American Hegemony or Impotence?, 1 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 37 (2000).
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jurisdiction, of particular significance is the offense of crimes against human-
ity.80 Further, relevant international law instruments that bear on the incident
(or analogous terrorist incidents) include, inter alia, the Hague Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the Tokyo Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the Mon-
treal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Ter-
rorist Bombings.81 Although these treaties do not directly criminalize the ac-
tions, they often require criminalization at the domestic level and/or set forth
mutual law enforcement cooperation and extradition procedures.82 Under US
federal law, the acts violated certain sections of the Antiterrorism Act of
199083 and the US statutes implementing the Montreal Convention.84 Of
course, specific elements of the attacks violated the criminal law of the US
states (and the District of Columbia) where they occurred, such as the prohi-
bitions on murder and the various forms of accomplice participation.
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80. A crime against humanity involves the commission of certain acts, including murder and
“other inhumane acts … causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health” when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population.” Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, art. 7.1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M.
999 (1998), M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 39 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
romefra.htm (Jun. 18, 2002). Widespread consensus exists that the attacks of 9/11 constituted
crimes against humanity. For an analysis of its applicability to the 9/11 attacks, see Cassese, supra
note 76.
81. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art.
1, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971); Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219;
Montreal Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. § 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570; Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 1, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 107.
On the applicability, or difficulties thereof, of the treaties to the 9/11 attacks, see Arnold N.
Pronto, Comment, ASIL INSIGHTS, Sep. 2001, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/
insigh77.htm (Jun. 18, 2002).
82. Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni has convincingly argued that the international law governing
this topic is not comprehensive. “[G]overnments have avoided developing an international legal
regime to prevent, control, and suppress terrorism, preferring instead the hodgepodge of thirteen
treaties that currently address its particular manifestations.” M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of
International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 83 (2002).
83. Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 et seq. (2000).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2000). See Jordan J. Paust, Addendum: Prosecution of Mr. bin Laden et al. for
Violations of International Law and Civil Lawsuits by Various Victims, ASIL INSIGHTS, Sep. 21,
2001, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (Jun. 18, 2002). Professor Paust also
discusses the possibility of civil suits against the perpetrators.
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It is apparent, therefore, that the international community does not view
the applicability of a criminal law enforcement regime as precluding a re-
sponse in self-defense to an armed attack by terrorists. That said, the prospect
of law enforcement bears on the issue of whether particular acts of self-defense
are necessary. Recall that necessity requires an absence of reasonable alterna-
tives to the defensive use of force. In this context, then, the state may only act
against the terrorists if classic law enforcement reasonably appears unlikely to
net those expected to conduct further attacks before they do so. One must be
careful here. There is no requirement for an expectation that law enforcement
will fail; rather, the requirement is that success not be expected to prove
timely enough to head off a continuation of the terrorist campaign. Of course,
if no further attacks are anticipated, the necessity principle would preclude re-
sort to armed force at all, since self-defense contains no retributive element.
In this case, the necessity of resort to force was obvious despite the nearly
global law enforcement effort to identify and apprehend members of the
al Qaeda network and prevent further attacks. Recall that al Qaeda had been
implicated in numerous prior acts of terrorism, most notably the 1998 East Af-
rican embassy bombings, and was at the time of the 9/11 attacks already the
target of a massive international law enforcement effort. Nevertheless, law en-
forcement failed to prevent the tragic events of September 11th. That is
hardly surprising. Al Qaeda is a shadowy, loose-knit terrorist organization in
which cells operate with substantial autonomy from scores of countries. The
complexity of coordinating law enforcement efforts in the face of widely diver-
gent capabilities, domestic laws and national attitudes was daunting. Further,
al Qaeda was headquartered in Afghanistan, then ruled by a government
seemingly oblivious to international pressure to deny al Qaeda its main base of
operations. Simply put, there was no guarantee that even a law enforcement
effort that was proving successful against much of the organization could ef-
fectively eradicate the threat of another major attack. At the same time, ag-
gressively attacking the senior leadership and denying it a base of operations
promised great returns in alleviating the threat, far greater than would likely
be realized by law enforcement in a comparable period. And it must be re-
membered that the clock was ticking. As the United States and its coalition
partners planned their response, warnings of imminent attacks flowed through
intelligence channels with great frequency.
Proportionality. The second core requirement of self-defense, that of propor-
tionality, also limits when a state may resort to self-defense in responding to a
terrorist act. Whereas necessity asks whether the use of force is appropriate,
proportionality asks how much may be applied.
36
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Like necessity, proportionality is affected by the prospect of law enforce-
ment activities. Even if armed force is necessary, the extent of that force may
be diminished by on-going or future law enforcement activities. In counter-
terrorist operations, law enforcement and military force can act synergisti-
cally, thereby reducing the level of force that needs to be applied (and affect-
ing its nature). For instance, law enforcement disruption of a number of
terrorist cells within an organization may lessen the extent (number, location,
etc.) of military strikes that need to be conducted. That is exactly what hap-
pened in the aftermath of 9/11. Thousands of potential terrorists were arrested
or detained worldwide, thereby dramatically reducing the need to resort to
force in countering future terrorism.
Were the strikes against al Qaeda proportionate, particularly in light of the
extensive parallel law enforcement campaign? Clearly, they were. Al Qaeda
forces in Afghanistan numbered in the thousands and were widely dispersed.
Moreover, to be disproportionate, the use of force would have had to be exces-
sive in relation to the degree of force actually needed to prevent continuation
of al Qaeda’s terrorist campaign. As of June 2002, al Qaeda forces remain in
the field, periodically engaging coalition forces, albeit in small unit fashion.
Further, intelligence sources have reported that mid-level al Qaeda operatives
have pulled the organization back together again and are forging alliances
with other terrorist groups. The organization reportedly “is as capable of plan-
ning and carrying out potent attacks on U.S. targets as the more centralized
network once led by Osama bin Laden.”85 So, despite the success of interna-
tional law enforcement and military efforts, al Qaeda remains a very viable
threat, continuing to operate from bases in any number of countries. The
group may have been gravely wounded, but it would be highly premature to
contend the wounds are fatal.
That said, the increasing effectiveness of international counter-terrorist
law enforcement efforts and the fact that the fight may now need to be taken
outside the borders of Afghanistan do raise questions regarding the propor-
tionality of future military efforts. Using an extreme example for the sake of il-
lustration, one might question the proportionality of a large scale military
operation mounted into an uncooperative state which refuses to hand over a
small number of low-level operatives. The action might be necessary in the
sense that diplomacy and law enforcement offered slim prospects of taking
37
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85. David Johnson et al., Qaeda Lieutenants Form Terror Alliance, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, June
17, 2002, at 1.
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them out of the terrorist network, but the extent of the use of force would ap-
pear to be more than reasonably required to accomplish the objective.
Imminency. As noted above, it would make little sense to evaluate each ter-
rorist attack individually in every case. Doing so would deny the reality that
most conflict, even conventional conflict between states, is a series of engage-
ments, with contact repeatedly made and broken. This being so, in many situ-
ations it may be reasonable to conclude that an attack was merely the opening
shot in an overall campaign that in itself constitutes a single on-going armed
attack.
That is exactly the case with regard to the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda had been
involved in terrorism against US assets for a decade, terrorism that resulted in
extensive property damage, loss of life and injury. Although there was often a
hiatus between attacks, they did occur with some regularity. In light of this
record, it is absurd to suggest al Qaeda would terminate the campaign after
achieving its most significant victory; logic would impel just the opposite con-
clusion. Additionally, not only did al Qaeda’s own statements style continued
attacks as a religious duty, one of the organization’s central objectives, with-
drawal of US and coalition forces from Islamic territory, remained unfulfilled.
Since 9/11, multiple al Qaeda related plots have been uncovered or foiled,
most recently that involving use of a “dirty (radiological) bomb” against a US
population center.86 Thus, it is not necessary to speculate on whether further
attacks were likely and imminent on October 7th; they clearly were (and re-
main so).
Cross-border counter-terrorist operations. While it is appropriate to extend
self-defense to acts committed by non-state actors, and though the availability
of criminal law enforcement responses does not preclude doing so, since non-
state actors possess no territory as a matter of international law (they may in
fact), can the victim state enter another state’s territory in order to conduct
self-defense operations? The answer requires balancing the rights and duties
of the respective states involved. The state in which the terrorists are located
has a right of territorial integrity. This well-established customary interna-
tional law right creates corresponding duties in other states. For instance, Ar-
ticle 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the
“territorial integrity . . . of any State.”87 Commentators generally agree that
38
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86. On the continuing operations of the organization, see David Johnston et al., Qaeda’s New
Links Increase Threats From Far-Flung Sites, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 1.
87. U.N. CHARTER, 2(4).
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the prohibition extends to any non-consensual penetration of a state’s terri-
tory, not simply those intended to seize parts of that territory.88 Non-compli-
ance may amount to an act of aggression.89
However, the state victimized by terrorism has a right to self-defense. No
one would dispute that a state forfeits a degree of its right to territorial integ-
rity when it commits acts that vest the right to self-defense in another state, at
least to the extent necessary for self-defense to be meaningful. Thus, an armed
attack by state A may justify the crossing of state B’s military forces into state
A to put an end to the attack.
Lest the right to self-defense be rendered empty in the face of terrorism, in
certain circumstances the principle of territorial integrity must yield to that of
self-defense against terrorists. Putting aside the issue of when the acts of ter-
rorists may be ascribed to a state, thereby justifying self-defense directly
against that state, the balancing of self-defense and territorial integrity de-
pends on the extent to which the state in which the terrorists are located has
complied with its own responsibilities vis-à-vis the terrorists.
As John Basset Moore noted in the Lotus case, “it is well settled that a State
is bound to use due diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions
of criminal acts against another nation or its people. . . .”90 This principle has
been reflected in numerous pronouncements on terrorism. For instance, the
1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations urges each state to “refrain
from . . . acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed toward
39
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88. Randelzhoffer, Article 2(4), supra note 42, at 117. See also Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:
Every State has a duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or
use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United
Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues.
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., anx, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2625 (1970), reprinted in
65 AM. J. INT’L L. 243 (1971) and in KEY RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, 1946–1996 (Dietrich Rauschning, Katja Wiesbrock & Martin Lailach eds., 1997), at
3 [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. The resolution was adopted by acclamation.
89. Aggression is the use of “armed force by a State against the . . . territorial integrity . . . of
another State.” Definition of Aggression, anx, art. 1, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), 13 INT’L LEG. MAT’L 710 (1974).
Additionally, pursuant to Article 3, aggression includes “[t]he invasion or attack by the armed
forces of a State of the territory of another State. . . .”
90. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 88 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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the commission of [terrorist acts in another state],”91 a proscription echoed in
the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate Terrorism.92 In the context of
the instant case, recall the 1999, 2000 and 2001 Security Council resolutions
condemning the Taliban’s willingness to allow territory they controlled to be
used by al Qaeda.
Should a state be unable or unwilling to comply with this obligation, the
victim state is then permitted to enter the territory of the state where the ter-
rorists are located for the limited purpose of conducting self-defense opera-
tions against them. This is only logical, since the unwillingness or inability of
state A to comply with the requirements of international law cannot possibly
be deemed to deprive state B of its authority to defend itself against an armed
attack, the seminal right of the state-centric international normative archi-
tecture. Of course, all requirements of self-defense must be met. There must
be an on-going armed attack (or armed campaign), no reasonable alternative
to the penetration of state A’s territory for the purpose of using force against
the terrorists can exist, and the force used has to be limited to that necessary
to accomplish the defensive objectives. Once those objectives are attained,
state B must immediately withdraw because at that point there is no right of
self-defense to justify its “violation” of state A’s territorial integrity. Further if,
during the self-defense operations, state A takes actions that comply with
its obligation to deny use of its territory to terrorists, state B’s right of self-
defense will diminish accordingly. Finally, state A may not interfere with the
self-defense operations, as state B is simply exercising a right under interna-
tional law. Since state B’s use of force is lawful, any other state’s use of force
against it would constitute an “armed attack.”93
In fact, there have been numerous instances of states exercising this self-
help right of self-defense. In the aftermath of the coalition operations against
Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law
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91. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 88.
92. Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., 49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/49/743 (1994); Declaration to
Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res.
51/210, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/51/631 (1996).
93. Professor Robert Turner perceptively offered an analysis along these lines in the aftermath of
the September 11th attacks. Robert F. Turner, International Law And The Use Of Force In
Response To The World Trade Center And Pentagon Attacks, JURIST, available at http://
jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew34.htm (Jun. 18, 2002). On the subject of self-help, see also
Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating state-Sponsored Terrorism: Self Defense and Peacetime
Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 243 (1987); Franz W. Paasche, The Use of Force in
Combating Terrorism, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 377 (1987); Oscar Schachter, The Extra-
Territorial Use of Force against Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 309 (1989).
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al Qaeda, the most often cited has been US General John Pershing’s unsuc-
cessful 1916 foray into Mexico after Pancho Villa and his bandits killed 18
Americans in New Mexico. At the time, Mexico was in the midst of a revolu-
tion and, thus, incapable of effectively controlling Villa. Note that the Mexi-
can government asked the US forces to withdraw three months after they
entered Mexican territory, a demand refused on the basis of Mexico’s inability
to police Villa. Similarly, during the Vietnam conflict, the United States con-
ducted aerial and ground attacks against enemy forces that had sought refuge
in Cambodia. Although criticized widely, such criticism was arguably more the
product of general anti-war fervor, than concern over the legality of the opera-
tions.94 In another example, Israel conducted airstrikes against PLO facilities in
Tunisia during 1985 on the grounds that the PLO was using Tunisia as a base of
operations for terrorist attacks on Israel—with the acquiescence of the Tunisian
government.95 The Security Council, with the United States abstaining, con-
demned the bombings as an “act of armed aggression perpetrated by Israel
against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, international law and norms of conduct” in a 14–0 vote.96 Whether con-
cern centered on the alleged violation of international law or on the fact that
the operation posed a “threat to the peace and security in the Mediterranean
region”97 (and on general hostility to Israel) remains an open question.
Political unacceptability instead of normative concern also drove most in-
ternational criticism of South Africa’s operations against African National
Congress groups based in Angola during the 1970s.98 Similarly, the interna-
tional community was unsupportive as Turkey mounted regular incursions
into Northern Iraq against Kurdish terrorists throughout the 1990s. As in the
South African case, opposition arguably was driven by factors other than the
legal acceptability of crossing into Iraq. At the time there was de minimus
concern over violation of Iraq’s territorial integrity, as Iraqi forces and
41
Michael Schmitt
94. On the Cambodian incursions, see Timothy Guiden, Defending America’s Cambodian
Incursion, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 215 (1994); John Fried, United States Military Intervention
in Cambodia in the Light of International Law, reprinted in 3 THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (Richard Falk, ed. 1972); International Law and Military Operations
Against Insurgents in Neutral Territories, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1127 (1968).
95. See statement of [then] Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Benjamin Netanyahu, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.2615, at 86–7 (Oct. 4, 1985).
96. S. C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., U.N. Doc S/573/(1985).
97. Id.
98. See W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 3,
53 (1999); G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
Res/45/150 (1990).
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government officials were already excluded from the area due to their suppres-
sion of the Kurds. Rather, criticism most likely derived from irritation over in-
terference with the relief and no-fly operations in northern Iraq99 and concern
over a track record of human rights abuses against the Kurds during Turkish
military operations conducted in Southeastern Turkey.100
Most recently, the United States launched raids on terrorist facilities in Af-
ghanistan and Sudan following the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in
Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam.101 Although the cruise missile strike against the al
Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (it was allegedly involved in chemical
weapons production) was criticized, most censure surrounded the alleged in-
validity of the claim of a connection between the plant and international ter-
rorism, not the violation of Sudanese territory;102 the attacks against al Qaeda
training bases in Afghanistan evoked little condemnation. Nor did the 1999
pursuit of Hutu guerrillas in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Ugandan
forces following a massacre of foreign tourists,103 although the international-
ization of the conflict did draw international concern and resulted in the dis-
patch of a peacekeeping force by the Security Council.104
Of greatest normative relevance on the issue of cross-border counter-
terrorist operations is the famous Caroline incident cited above in regard to
the core requirements of self-defense.105 Recall the facts. In 1837 a rebellion
was underway in Canada against the British. Some of the rebels were based in
the United States. The British attempted to negotiate with the American
side, in particular the Governor of New York, to no avail. At that point they
42
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99. First Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, later NORTHERN WATCH. The author was staff judge
advocate of the operations during this period.
100. See, e.g., Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey,
available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/turkey.html (Jun.
18, 2002).
101. Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT’L L.
559 (1999); Leah M. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to
Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067 (2000).
102. On the confusion surrounding whether the facility was involved in terrorist activities, see
Vernon Loeb, U.S. Wasn’t Sure Plant Had Nerve Gas Role; Before Sudan Strike, CIA Urged More
Tests, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1999, at A1.
103. Reisman, supra note 98, at 54.
104. In S. C. Res. 1291, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1291/(2000), the Council
authorized the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
For details and background, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/monuc_body.htm (Jun.
18, 2002).
105. On the Caroline incident in the context of the issue at hand, see Reisman, supra note 98, at
42–47. On the facts, see R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (1938).
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mounted a small raid (80 men) into the United States where they seized the
Caroline, a vessel used by the rebels and their supporters. The ship was set
ablaze and sent over Niagara Falls.
The incident generated a fascinating correspondence over the next several
years between the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of
State. The issue in dispute, though, was not whether the British could legiti-
mately cross into the United States for the limited purpose of attacking the re-
bels. Instead, controversy focused on the circumstances permitting them to do
so and how. As Lord Ashburton, the Foreign Minister, wrote to his US coun-
terpart, Daniel Webster:
I might safely put it to any candid man, acquainted with the existing state of
things, to say whether the military commander in Canada had the remotest
reason, on the 29th day of December, to expect to be relieved from this state of
suffering by the protective intervention of any American authority. How long
could a Government, having the paramount duty of protecting its own people,
be reasonably expected to wait for what they had then no reason to expect?106
Ashburton’s premise that crossing the border was proper in the absence of ef-
fective action by the authorities where the rebels were based went unchal-
lenged, with Webster simply asserting that the action had been excessive in the
particular circumstances of the case.107
43
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106. Letter from Lord Ashburton to Daniel Webster (July 28, 1842), 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN
STATE PAPERS 195.
107. A necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of
Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the
territories of The United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the
act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept
clearly within it. It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on
board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have been unavailing; it must be shown
that day-light could not be waited for; that there could be no attempt at discrimination
between the innocent and the guilty; that it would not have been enough to seize and
detain the vessel; but that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking
her in the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed men
were asleep on board, killing some and wounding others, and then drawing her into the
current, above the cataract, setting her on fire, and, careless to know whether there
might not be in her the innocent with the guilty, or the living with the dead,
committing her to a fate which fills the imagination with horror. A necessity for all this,
the Government of The United States cannot believe to have existed.
Jennings, supra note 105, at 89 (quoting Daniel Webster).
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Therefore, quite aside from the trinity of self-defense criteria, Caroline sup-
ports the principle that a state suffering attack from non-state actors in another
may, after seeking assistance from that state (assuming the requested state is
capable of doing so), enter its territory for the limited purpose of preventing fur-
ther attacks, although its actions must be necessary and proportional. State
practice seems guardedly consistent. Objections to such limited cases as have
occurred are usually attributable to political, vice normative, motivations. Of
course, in fairness, the same could be said regarding the relative absence of criti-
cism when penetrating the territory of ostracized states, such as Afghanistan, in
operations against organizations which enjoy no consequential support from
members of the international community, such as al Qaeda. The better interpre-
tation, however, is that, as a general matter, state practice, beginning with the
Caroline case, supports the approach posited.
Do US and coalition operations in Afghanistan comport with this stan-
dard? Recall the Security Council’s pre and post 9/11 demands that the
Taliban cease allowing territory they controlled to be used as a terrorist base
and that they cooperate in bringing Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to justice.
Recall also the US demands that the Taliban unconditionally surrender bin
Laden and other al Qaeda leaders and grant the United States sufficient ac-
cess to terrorist bases to ensure their inoperability. In reply, the Taliban re-
gime first stated it wished to see the evidence linking bin Laden to the 9/11
attacks.108 As the likelihood of US strikes drew closer, the Taliban indicated
that they had Osama bin Laden and might be willing to negotiate, possibly
about turning him over to a third country. The United States again stated that
only an unconditional surrender of bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders
would suffice.109 After the coalition attacks commenced, the Taliban renewed
the offer. However, the US administration maintained its no-negotiation
stance.110
Were the US demands, particularly in that they were unconditional, suffi-
cient? It might be argued that no demand at all was necessary, for on multiple
occasions the Security Council had insisted that the Taliban comply with the
Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law
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108. Murphy, Contemporary Practice 2002, supra note 39, at 244. The situation caused divisions
within the Taliban and Afghan religious leadership. Clearly, unanimity did not exist as to how to
respond to the US demands. John F. Burns, Afghans Coaxing bin Laden, But U.S. Rejects Clerics’
Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 21, 2001, at A1.
109. Murphy, Contemporary Practice 2002, supra note 39, at 244.
110. Elisabeth Bumiller, President Rejects Offer By Taliban For Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2001, at A1.
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measures sought by the United States. Consider, for instance, the following
unambiguous language in Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000):
[The Security Council] Demands . . . that the Taliban comply without further
delay with the demand of the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 1267
(1999) that requires the Taliban to turn over Usama bin Laden to appropriate
authorities in a country where he has been indicted, or to appropriate
authorities in a country where he will be returned to such a country, or to
appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested and effectively
brought to justice;
Demands further that the Taliban should act swiftly to close up all camps where
terrorists are trained within the territory under its control, and calls for the
confirmation of such closures by the United Nations, inter alia, through
information made available to the United Nations by Member States in
accordance with paragraph 19 below and through such other means as are
necessary to assure compliance with this resolution. . . .111
Extended non-compliance with the Security Council demands arguably
provided a good faith basis for determining that further exhortations would
prove fruitless. However, the Council’s insistence was made in the context of
cooperative law enforcement (albeit in the face of a threat to international
peace and security) rather than self-defense. Therefore, the most defensible
position is that while non-compliance strengthened the political case for ac-
tion by the Security Council under Chapter VII, a separate demand was re-
quired for action by a state pursuant to the right to self-defense.
As noted, the United States made one. Unconditionality was certainly rea-
sonable in the circumstances. The United States had just suffered a horren-
dous terrorist attack, with every reason to believe more were imminent. The
Taliban request for evidence of al Qaeda’s complicity might have made sense
but for the previous Security Council resolutions, which clearly rendered the
request superfluous. Moreover, the United States government, which had
been conducting talks with the Taliban since 1996 over the presence of
al Qaeda in Afghanistan, had previously provided evidence of al Qaeda respon-
sibility for the 1998 bombings of the two US embassies in East Africa—at the re-
quest of Taliban officials.112 The provision of that evidence, and the continuing




111. S. C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1333/(2000).
112. UK Press Release, supra note 9, at paras. 14–15.
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Additionally, unless the Taliban regime controlled al Qaeda absolutely,
which it did not, post 9/11 negotiations would merely have extended the win-
dow of vulnerability for the United States. If the right to self-defense was to be
meaningful in these circumstances, the United States needed to act as quickly
as possible. This meant that either the Taliban should have complied with the
demands promptly or acknowledged they lacked the capability to do so and
stood aside as the United States entered Afghanistan to engage al Qaeda.
In other words, the adequacy of a request to the state in which terrorists are
located, as well as the sufficiency of the response thereto, must be assessed
contextually. Have there been prior requests? For what? What is the nature of
relations between the requesting and requested state? Between the terrorist
group and the state in which it is located? What capability does the requested
state have to counter or control the terrorists? What is its track record in do-
ing so? What are the nature and the imminency of the threat by the terrorists
against the requesting state? Under the circumstances, the US decision to at-
tack al Qaeda on October 7th, despite Taliban quibbling over the US request
to turn over members of the organization, was reasonable and legally
defensible.
There are two other circumstances in which it is unquestionable that one
state can enter the territory of another to conduct defensive counter-terrorist
operations. The first is upon invitation, though any such operation would
have to comply with the relevant provisions of human rights and humanitar-
ian law, as well as any conditions imposed by the host state.113 Obviously, that
did not occur in the case of Afghanistan. More problematic is the situation in
which the terrorist group acts on behalf of the state such that its attacks can
be deemed those of the state itself. As in traditional armed attacks by a state
actor, the sole question regarding the penetration of the attacker’s territory is
whether cross-border operations are necessary, proportional and in response
to an armed attack. To the extent the state could be attacked in self-defense,
so too can the terrorist group that actually executed the armed attack. The is-
sue of Taliban support for al Qaeda is considered in the following section.
Summarized, the campaign against al Qaeda in Afghanistan is a legitimate
exercise of the right to individual and collective self-defense. The right ex-
tends to armed attacks from whatever source, the 9/11 attacks met the thresh-
old requirement of being “armed,” crossing into Afghanistan was appropriate
46
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113. On the conduct of forces in another country, see THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
VISITING FORCES (Dieter Fleck ed., 2001).
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once the Taliban failed to police the territory they controlled, the attacks
were necessary and proportionate, and they occurred in the face of an immi-
nent, credible continuation of an al Qaeda campaign that had been underway
for a period measured in years.
Operations Against the Taliban
In his address to a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September, President Bush
uttered his ominous warning that “[e]ither you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or sup-
port terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”114
When the attacks began, the United States cited the Taliban’s decision to “al-
low the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by [al Qaeda] as a base
of operation,” a policy which the Taliban refused to alter despite repeated en-
treaties to do so, as justification for their actions.115 It should be noted that in
June 2001 the United States had already warned the Taliban regime that it
would be held responsible for any terrorist acts committed by terrorists that it
was sheltering.116
The United Kingdom has released the most extensive information to date
regarding the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban.117 Al Qaeda
provided troops, weapons and financing to the Taliban for its conflict with the
Northern Alliance. The organization was also reportedly involved in the plan-
ning and execution of Taliban operations, assisted in training Taliban forces,
and had representatives assigned to the Taliban command and control struc-
ture. Additionally, al Qaeda was a source of “infrastructure assistance and hu-
manitarian aid.”118 In return, the Taliban granted al Qaeda safe haven and a
base for its terrorist training camps; essentially, al Qaeda enjoyed free rein to
do as it pleased in Taliban controlled territory. Further, the two groups coop-
erated closely in the drug trade, with the Taliban providing security for
al Qaeda’s drug stockpiles.119 Was this relationship such that conducting
Michael Schmitt
47
114. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, supra note 16, at
1349.
115. US Letter, supra note 22.
116. UK Press Release, supra note 9, para. 16.
117. See id. generally. See also the update to the UK press release. United Kingdom Press Release,
10 Downing Street Newsroom, Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, Nov.
14, 2001, available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=3025 (Jun. 18, 2002).
118. UK Press Release, supra note 9, para. 12.
119. Id., para. 13.
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military operations against the Taliban on October 7th was a legitimate exer-
cise of the use of force by the United States and United Kingdom?
State Responsibility. Unfortunately, there has been much confusion sur-
rounding the relationship between Taliban obligations and the attacks
mounted against them on October 7th. In the discussion of self-defense
against al Qaeda, it was noted that the Taliban had a duty to keep their terri-
tory from being used as a base of terrorist operations. Failure to comply with
that duty in part justified penetrating Afghan territory when attacking al
Qaeda, albeit only to conduct operations against al Qaeda. If the Taliban were
incapable of stopping al Qaeda, then they would incur no responsibility for
their failure to address the situation.
On the other hand, if capable, but unwilling, the Taliban would be responsi-
ble for their failure under the international law of state responsibility.120 The
duty to desist from assisting terrorists in any way is manifest. In 1996 the Gen-
eral Assembly articulated this duty in the Declaration on the Strengthening of
International Security. Specifically, it stated that:
States, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and other relevant rules of international law, must refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in territories of
other States, or from acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their
territories directed towards the commission of such acts.121
In doing so, it echoed earlier exhortations in the 1970 Friendly Relations
Declaration122 and its 1965 progenitor, Resolution 2131 (1965). 123 Similar
48
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120. On the issue of state responsibility, see Gregory Townsend, State Responsibility for Acts of De
Facto Agents, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 635 (1997); Ian Brownlie, International Law and the
Activities of Bands, 7 INT’L & COMP. L. QTRLY 712 (1958).
121. Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N.
GAOR, 6th Comm., 49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/49/743 (1994); Declaration to
Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res.
51/210, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/51/631 (1996).
122. “Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present
paragraph involve a threat or use of force.” Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 88,
prin. 1.
123. “No state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite, or tolerate subversive, terrorist or
armed activities directed toward the violent overthrow of another regime. . . .” G.A. Resolution
2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 107, U.N. Doc. A/6221 (1965).
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prohibitions can be found in Article 2(4) of the International Law Commis-
sion’s 1954 Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind.124
Case law supports these declarations. Most notably, in the Corfu Channel
case the International Court of Justice held that “every State has an obliga-
tion to not knowingly allow its territory to be used in a manner contrary to the
rights of other States.”125 Corfu Channel involved an incident in which two
British destroyers struck mines in Albanian waters while transiting the Corfu
Strait in 1946. Though the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the
Albanians laid the mines, the Court nevertheless held that they had the obli-
gation to notify shipping of the danger posed by the mines. Albania’s failure to
do so represented an internationally wrongful act entailing the international
responsibility of Albania. Other case law and arbitral decisions are in ac-
cord.126
Applying the Corfu Channel principle to the case of terrorism, states that
permit their territory to be used as a base of operations for terrorist acts against
other countries have committed an international wrong. There is no question
that Taliban acquiescence in allowing Afghan territory to be used by al Qaeda,
Michael Schmitt
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124. The organization, or the encouragement of the organization, by the authorities of a
State, of armed bands within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the
territory of another state, or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its own
territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed bands of its territory as a base of
operations or as a point of departure for incursions into the territory of another State, as
well as direct participation in or support of such incursions.
Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2(4), available at http://
www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/offfra.htm (Jun. 18, 2002).
125. Corfu Channel Case (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22.
126. See discussion in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 77–85
(2002). Article 2 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility
(adopted by the Commission in 2001) provides that “There is an internationally wrongful act of a
State when conduct consisting of an act or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under
international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”
International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility, reprinted in id. at 61. These
elements have been articulated in a number of tribunals. Among those referenced specifically by
Professor Crawford are: Phosphates in Morocco, Preliminary Objections, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/
B, No. 74, p. 10; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p.
3; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Merits, I.C.J.
Reports 1986, p. 14, 117–118, para. 226; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),
I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, 54, para. 78.
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assuming arguendo that their conduct is attributable to the “State” of Afghani-
stan,127 created responsibility under international law for that wrongful act.
Does this responsibility justify the October 7th attacks by the United States
and the United Kingdom?
Despite occasionally loose discussion of the subject in the aftermath of 9/
11, the existence of state responsibility for an international wrong does not
justify the use of force in self-help to remedy the wrong. Traditional repara-
tions for an international wrong come in the form of restitution, compensation
or satisfaction.128 It is also permissible to take countermeasures in response to
an internationally wrongful act.129 Countermeasures are “measures which
would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of the injured
State vis-à-vis the responsible State if they were not taken by the former in re-
sponse to an internationally wrongful act by the latter in order to procure ces-
sation and reparation.”130 Various requirements, such as the existence of an
on-going wrong,131 proportionality of the countermeasure to the injury suf-
fered,132 and a call on the state committing the wrong to comply with its
obligations133 apply to the taking of countermeasures.
But it is generally agreed that countermeasures employing armed force are
prohibited.134 Article 50 of the Articles on State Responsibility specifically
provides that “Countermeasures shall not affect . . . the obligation to refrain
from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Na-
tions.”135 This provision tracks the holding in Corfu Channel. There the
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127. The Commentary to the ILC Articles on State Responsibility describes a “state” as “a real
organized entity, a legal person to act under international law.” Crawford, supra note 126, at 82
(para. 5 of commentary to art. 2).
128. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 126, arts. 34–37. Restitution is reestablishing
“the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed” (art. 35); compensation is
covering any financially assessable damage not made good by restitution (art. 36); satisfaction is
“an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another
appropriate modality” that responds to shortfalls in restitution and compensation when making
good the injury caused (art. 37).
129. Id., art. 49.1.
130. Crawford, supra note 126, at 281.
131. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 126, art. 52.3(a).
132. Id., art. 51.
133. Id., art. 52.1.
134. Certain countermeasures employing force are permissible. An example would be sending
agents into a state to apprehend a terrorist who that state wrongfully refused to extradite. Mary
Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Responses to Terrorism, JURIST, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
forum/forumnew30.htm (Jun. 18, 2002).
135. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 126, art. 50.1(a).
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International Court of Justice held that Albania’s failure to comply with its re-
sponsibility did not justify the British minesweeping of the Strait, an act that
therefore constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty. Thus, breach of the
obligation not to allow Afghanistan to be used as a base for terrorist activities
did not, alone, justify use of force against the Taliban.
An identical analysis would apply in assessing whether the actions of
al Qaeda in conducting the 9/11 (and other) attacks can be attributed to the
Taliban under the law of state responsibility. The International Law Commis-
sion’s Articles on State Responsibility set forth the standards for imputing an
armed group’s acts to a state for the purpose of assessing state responsibility.
Two are relevant here.
Article 8 provides that the “conduct of a person or group shall be consid-
ered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons
is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that State in carrying out the conduct.”136 This was the issue in the Nicaragua
case, where Nicaragua argued that the United States was responsible under
international law for violations of humanitarian law committed by the
Contras, the anti-Sandinista rebel group it supported. After finding that the
United States had provided “subsidies and other support”, the Court held
that:
United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive in the financing,
organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its
military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is
still insufficient in itself, . . . for the purpose of attributing to the United States
the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military or paramilitary
operations in Nicaragua. All the forms of United States participation
mentioned above, and even the general control by the respondent state over a
force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean,
without further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the
perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged
by the applicant State. . . . For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of
the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which
the alleged violations were committed.137
Aside from the Contras, certain individuals, not of US nationality, were
paid by the United States and directly instructed and supervised by US
Michael Schmitt
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136. Id., art. 8.
137. Nicaragua, supra note 60, para. 115.
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military and intelligence personnel. For instance, they carried out such opera-
tions as mining Nicaraguan ports. The Court easily found their actions imput-
able to the United States, either because they were paid and instructed by the
US, and were therefore agents thereof, or because US personnel had “partici-
pated in the planning, direction, support and execution” of particular opera-
tions.138
The evidence released to date regarding Taliban ties to al Qaeda does not
suggest that al Qaeda was under the direction or control of the Taliban in con-
ducting the 9/11 attacks or any other acts of international terrorism. In fact,
some have suggested precisely the opposite—that it was the Taliban that was
dependent on al Qaeda, both financially and militarily. While that may be a
more accurate characterization, such dependency bears little direct connec-
tion to al Qaeda’s international terrorist campaign.
Article 11 sets forth a second possibly relevant standard. It provides that
“[c]onduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall
nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to
the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct as its own.”139
This principle lay at the core of the International Court of Justice’s Diplomatic
and Consular Staff case.140 There the Court held that the Iranian government vi-
olated its responsibility to prevent the 1979 seizure by militant students of the
US Embassy in Tehran and subsequently failed to meet its obligation to act
promptly in ending the seizure.141 Following the takeover, the Iranian govern-
ment, including its leader, the Ayatollah Khomeni, expressed approval of the
student actions. Indeed, in a decree issued within two weeks of the seizure,
Khomeni declared that “the hostages would remain as they were until the U.S.
had handed over the former Shah for trial” and that “the noble Iranian nation
will not give permission for the release . . . until the American Government acts
according to the wish of the nation.”142 For the International Court of Justice,
“[t]he approval given . . . by the Ayatollah Khomeni and other organs of the Ira-
nian state, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupa-
tion of the Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State.”143
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138. Id., para. 86.
139. Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 126, art. 11.
140. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Iran v. USA), 1980 I.C.J. 3.
141. According to the court, Iranian authorities were “fully aware of their obligations to protect
the premises of the U.S. Embassy and its diplomatic and consular staff from any attack [,] . . . had
the means at their disposal to perform their obligations [but,] . . . completely failed to comply.”
Id., para. 68.
142. Id., para. 73.
143. Id., para. 74.
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Therefore, while the Iranian government breached its own obligations when the
Embassy was taken, it became responsible for the seizure itself (or at least the
continuing occupation thereof) when it supported the student actions and took
steps to continue the occupation.
Are the Taliban responsible for the 9/11 attacks under the principle of at-
tribution of state responsibility? The level of Taliban support falls far below
that of the Iranian government in the Embassy case. It did not express open
and public support for the attacks, nor did it ever assume control of the terror-
ist campaign in the way that the Iranian government took control over release
of the US hostages. Further, although its military did conduct combat opera-
tions against US and coalition forces in concert with al Qaeda, that was only
after October 7th, following air attacks on its own facilities and personnel.
By either of these two standards of state responsibility, it is difficult to attrib-
ute al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks to the Taliban. That said, any such assessment is
fact-dependant; unfortunately, many of the relevant facts tying the Taliban to
al Qaeda and vice versa remain either unreleased or as yet undiscovered. How-
ever, what must be remembered in discussions over the state responsibility of
the Taliban is that the existence of responsibility in the general sense is a ques-
tion quite distinct from that of whether an armed attack has been committed by
that state, so as to justify self-defense by the state attacked. This is a very fine
point. The principles of state responsibility determine when a state may be held
responsible for an act and thus subject to reparations or countermeasures. But
as noted, forcible countermeasures are not an acceptable remedy for violations
of state responsibility. That is so whether the issue is harboring a terrorist group
or being responsible for an act committed by one.
Nevertheless, certain acts that generate state responsibility may at the
same time justify a violent response. Although forcible countermeasures are
impermissible to make whole the victim or cause the wrongdoer to desist in
breaching an international obligation, the application of force against the
Michael Schmitt
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144. This reality explains why the prohibition on forcible countermeasures is reasonable; the ban is
compensated for in those cases where one might most want to engage in them—when victimized by
an armed attack—by the existence of the right to self-defense. Conversely, the various limits on self-
defense are compensated for by the fact that once the need for self-defense vanishes, the state that
committed the wrongful attack remains liable for the consequences under the law of state
responsibility. The classic example is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In S. C. Res. 681, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/681/(1991), the Security Council found that “Iraq . . . is liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of
natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.” It subsequently established the United Nations
Compensation Commission to handle claims in S. C. Res. 692, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/692/(1991).
E:\BLUE BOOK\VOL 79 TERROR\VENTURA FILES\VOL 79 BB TERROR 11_18_03.VP
Thursday, April 28, 2005 8:21:15 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
wrongdoer may be justified as an act of self-defense in the face of an imminent
or on-going armed attack.144 Restated in the context of the present case, the
proper query in assessing the lawfulness of attacking the Taliban on October
7th is not whether the Taliban are in any way responsible under principles of
state responsibility for the acts of 9/11. Rather, it is whether or not the Taliban
can be determined to have committed the armed attack under the law of self-
defense.
Self-Defense. No evidence has been released to suggest that Taliban forces
played a direct role in the attacks of 9/11 or any other al Qaeda operation.
Was the Taliban relationship with al Qaeda nevertheless such that the terror-
ist acts constructively amounted to a Taliban armed attack?
The precise degree of association between a non-state organization and
state sponsor necessary for attribution of an armed attack to the state is a mat-
ter of some controversy.145 However, on September 11th, the most widely ac-
cepted legal standard on the issue was that set forth in the Nicaragua case.
That case was discussed earlier vis-à-vis the nature of an armed attack, as well
as state responsibility. However, the International Court of Justice also ad-
dressed the issue of imputing an armed attack to a state.
In the case, the United States argued that Nicaragua had conducted an
armed attack against El Salvador through support to guerillas attempting to
overthrow the El Salvadoran government. This being so, US activities di-
rected against Nicaragua were, so the argument went, legitimate exercises of
the right of collective self-defense with El Salvador. The Court rejected the
assertion, setting a high standard for attributing the actions of a non-state ac-
tor to a state in the context of an armed attack.
There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can
be treated as constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be considered to
be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely
action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also “the
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to” (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by
regular forces, “or its substantial involvement therein”. This description,
54
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145. For instance, Oscar Schachter has argued “When a government provides weapons, technical
advice, transportation, aid and encouragement to terrorists on a substantial scale, it is not
unreasonable to conclude that an armed attack is imputable to the government.” Oscar Schachter,
The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists in Another Country, reprinted in HENRY H. HAN,
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 250 (1993). See also Alberto Coll, The Legal and Moral
Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. 297 (1987).
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contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed
to General Assembly resolution 3314(XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary
international law.146
By this standard, the state to which the acts are to be attributed must be
“substantially involved” in an operation that is so grave it would amount to an
armed attack if carried out by regular members of its armed forces. Recall from
the earlier discussion of the holding that armed attacks are measured in terms
of their scale and effects, and that the Court specifically held that the provi-
sion of “weapons or logistical or other support” was insufficient. Further, to
constitute an armed attack by the state, that state must have “sent” the group
into action or it must be acting on the state’s behalf. These criteria resemble
the requirement under state responsibility that the group in question act on
the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the state to which re-
sponsibility is to be imputed. In this sense, the principles of state responsibility
can assist in determining whether specific conduct is an armed attack.
It should be noted that the Court was not unanimous in its findings. Most
notably, Judge Stephen Schwebel of the United States dissented, arguing that
there had been an armed attack:
The delictual acts of the Nicaraguan government have not been confined to
provision of very large quantities of arms, munitions and supplies (an act which
of itself might be viewed as not tantamount to an armed attack); Nicaragua
(and Cuba) have joined with the Salvadoran rebels in the organization,
planning and training for their acts of insurgency; and Nicaragua has provided
the Salvadoran insurgents with command-and-control facilities, bases,
communications and sanctuary, which have enabled the leadership of the
Salvadoran insurgency to operate from Nicaraguan territory. Under both
customary and conventional international law, that scale of Nicaraguan
subversive activity not only constitutes unlawful intervention in the affairs of El
Salvador; it is cumulatively tantamount to an armed attack upon El Salvador.147
What seems to run through both the Court’s and Judge Schwebel’s position
is that the state must at least exercise significant, perhaps determinative, in-
fluence over the group’s decision-making, as well as play a meaningful role in
the specific operations at hand, before an armed attack will be imputed to it.
The facts asserted by Judge Schwebel suggest that Nicaragua not only pro-
vided the means to conduct operations against El Salvador, but it did so in a
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146. Nicaragua, supra note 60, at 195.
147. Id., (Schwebel dissent) at 258–259, para. 6.
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manner that would allow operations it helped plan to be mounted. Further, by
organizing and planning the actions, Nicaragua occupied a central position in
the decision-making hierarchy. By contrast, the Court focused almost exclu-
sively, as it did regarding the issue of state responsibility, on the extent of con-
trol the state has over the specific actions of the group.
There seems to be little evidence that the Taliban “sent” al Qaeda
against any particular targets or even that they provided the materiel and lo-
gistic support that the Nicaragua Court found insufficient to amount to an
armed attack. In essence, the key contribution made by the Taliban was
granting al Qaeda a relatively secure base of operations. By the classic Nicara-
gua test, or even the lower standard advocated by Judge Schwebel, it would be
difficult to argue that the Taliban, through complicity with al Qaeda,
launched an armed attack against the United States or any other country.
Harboring terrorists is simply insufficient for attribution of an armed attack to
the harboring state. Rather, the situation appears to have been a marriage of
convenience—convenient for al Qaeda’s conduct of external terrorist acts
and convenient for the Taliban’s control over territory within Afghanistan
and their battles with internal enemies.
One further judgment of relevance is that rendered by the Appeals Cham-
ber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prose-
cutor v. Tadic. There the issue was whether acts of Bosnian Serb forces could
be attributed to Yugoslavia. The Chamber held that the degree of control nec-
essary for attribution would vary according to the factual circumstances of the
case. Refusing to apply the Nicaragua approach in its entirety, the Chamber
adopted a standard of “overall control going beyond the mere financing and
equipping of such forces and involving also participation in the planning and
supervision of military operations” for acts by an “organized and hierarchically
structured group.”148 It felt the dual requirements of effective control of the
group and the exercise of control over a specific operation were excessive, ex-
cept in the cases of individuals acting alone or disorganized groups.
By way of caveat, it must be noted that Tadic involved neither state respon-
sibility nor the criteria for attribution of an armed attack. Rather, the issue was
whether the Bosnian Serb actions could be attributed to Yugoslavia such that
there was an international armed conflict. The existence of such a conflict
was a prerequisite for applicability of various aspects of humanitarian law to
56
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148. International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 38
I.L.M. 1518 (1999), at paras. 120 & 145.
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the defendants before the tribunal. Because there was no jurisprudence on the
issue, the Chamber turned to the law of state responsibility by way of analogy.
Again, and though the opinion is only relevant by analogy to the issue at
hand, it would appear that Taliban relations with al Qaeda did not rise to this
level. Thus, al Qaeda actions do not appear imputable to the Taliban as a mat-
ter of state responsibility, as an armed attack or in the context of having
caused an international armed conflict (although no doubt exists that its har-
boring of the terrorists was an internationally wrongful act). It must be empha-
sized, however, that this assessment is entirely fact-dependant, and that there
is a relative paucity of reliable open-source information on the subject.
To summarize, al Qaeda conducted an armed attack against the United
States on September 11th. That attack activated the right of self-defense, one
that continues as long as the terrorist campaign against the United States can
reasonably be characterized as ongoing. Once attacked, the United States
properly demanded that the Taliban turn over al Qaeda leaders and allow the
United States to verify that no further operations were ongoing from the
country. When the Taliban failed to comply, the United States and its part-
ners acquired the right to enter Afghanistan for the limited purpose of putting
an end to al Qaeda operations. Had it done so, and had the Taliban interfered,
the interference would have amounted to a separate attack of its own. How-
ever, from the evidence available, it does not appear that the Taliban were
sufficiently entwined with al Qaeda terrorist operations for the 9/11 attacks to
be imputed to it, thereby justifying the immediate use of force against the
Taliban. Were the attacks against the Taliban therefore illegal? That is a very
uncertain matter.
The Evolving Standard of Self-Defense
There is little doubt that the response to the tragic events of Septem-
ber 11th has tested accepted understandings of the international law regarding
the use of force. Many would dispute certain of the legal conclusions set forth
above—that a terrorist group can mount an “armed attack”; that a series of
terrorist attacks can be treated as a single on-going attack; or that the United
States and the United Kingdom were justified in forcibly crossing into Afghan
territory on October 7th. Indeed, this article has concluded that use of force di-
rectly against the Taliban is difficult to fit within traditional understandings of
attribution of an armed attack.
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Such unease has led some to pronounce the traditional normative system
dead in fact, if not in law. For instance, Michael Glennon has opined that:
the rules concerning the use of force are no longer regarded as obligatory by
states. Between 1945 and 1999, two-thirds of the members of the United
Nations—126 states out of 189—fought 291 interstate conflicts in which over
22 million people were killed. This series of conflicts was capped by the Kosovo
campaign in which nineteen NATO democracies representing 780 million
people flagrantly violated the Charter. The international system has come to
subsist in a parallel universe of two systems, one de jure, the other de facto. The
de jure system consists of illusory rules that would govern the use of force among
states in a platonic world of forms, a world that does not exist. The de facto
system consists of actual state practice in a real world, a world in which states
weigh costs against benefits in regular disregard of the rules solemnly proclaimed
in the all-but-ignored de jure system. The decaying de jure catechism is overly
schematized and scholastic, disconnected from state behavior, and unrealistic
in its aspirations for state conduct.
The upshot is that the Charter’s use-of-force regime has all but
collapsed. . . . I suggest that Article 51, as authoritatively interpreted by the
International Court of Justice, cannot guide responsible U.S. policy-makers in
the U.S. war against terrorism in Afghanistan or elsewhere.149
Professor Glennon’s thoughtful analysis exaggerates the de jure-de facto di-
vide. In fact, what has been happening over the past half-century is a regular
evolution in the global community’s understanding of the use of force regime.
This evolution has been, as it always is and always must be, responsive to the
changing circumstances in which international law operates. Practice does
not contradict law so much as it informs law as to the global community’s nor-
mative expectations. It is a phenomenon that is particularly important in in-
ternational law because of the absence of highly developed constitutive
entities and processes.
Consider the changing context in which use of force norms have operated.
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War an understandable
preference for collective remedies to threats to international peace and secu-
rity, remedies that would be executed through inclusive international institu-
tions, emerged—hence the United Nations and its restrictive use of force
regime. With the outbreak of the Cold War, and its resulting bipolarity, that
system fell into desuetude as the veto power of the permanent five members
58
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[P-5] rendered the Security Council impotent. States were therefore com-
pelled to engage in various forms of coercive self-help to perform tasks that
would otherwise have been the preferred prerogative of the Council.150
The demise of the Cold War removed two contextually determined con-
straining influences on the use of force. First, the Security Council was rein-
vigorated because the zero-sum paradigm of the Cold War no longer held; for
the first time in nearly 50 years, the P-5 could share common cause (or at least
not find themselves inevitably in opposition). This meant that the Council
could assume its intended role in the maintenance of international peace and
security. The Council promptly did so, authorizing one major international ef-
fort to counter aggression, the 1990–91 Gulf War, and multiple peace en-
forcement operations.
Second, the Cold War had imposed an implicit limitation on unilateral uses
of force—that they not threaten the fragile peace between East and West.
Thus, for example, whereas intervention was deemed inappropriate as a gen-
eral matter during the Cold War (it risked sparking a broader conflict), inter-
vention within a zone of influence appeared more palatable (or as “the other
fellow’s business”). With this second constraint removed, states today are
more willing to accept unilateral uses of force, as there is less chance of
spillover effects (as reflected by Operation ALLIED FORCE).
What happened is that the operational code regarding the use of force
shifted with the emergence of new geo-political circumstances. Circum-
stances determine the viability of normative strategies for advancing shared
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150. For instance, Michael Reisman has identified nine basic categories of unilateral uses of force
that enjoyed a significant degree of community support: “self-defense, which has been construed
quite broadly; self-determination and decolonization; humanitarian intervention; intervention
by the military instrument within spheres of influence and critical defense zones; treaty-
sanctioned interventions within the territory of another state; use of the military instrument for
the gathering of evidence in international proceedings; use of the military instrument to enforce
international judgments; and counter measures, such as reprisals and retorsions.” W. Michael
Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 279, 281
(1985). See also W. Michael Reisman, Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International
Law, PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. LAW 74, 79–84 (1984–85); W. Michael Reisman, War Powers:
The Operational Code of Competence, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 777 (1989).
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community values.151 It is not that new law emerges or that old law fades away,
as much as it is that the understanding of the precise parameters of the law
evolves as it responds to fresh challenges or leverages new opportunities. That
international law is understood in light of the circumstances in which it finds
itself is a strength, not a weakness.
This is certainly true regarding responses to terrorism. During much of the
Cold War, the pressing problem of violence outside the classic state-on-state
paradigm was guerilla warfare by insurgents against a government. Both sides
had their clients, whether states or rebel groups, and in many cases the con-
flicts were proxy in nature. The geopolitical and normative appeal of proxy
wars was that they tended to facilitate avoidance of a direct superpower clash.
Thus, as demonstrated in Nicaragua, a very high threshold was set for attribut-
ing rebel acts to their state sponsors or for characterizing assistance to a rebel
group as an “armed attack” legitimizing a victim state’s forceful response. This
was a very practical approach. The bipolar superpowers were surely going to
engage in such activity regardless of the normative limits thereon, so a legal
scheme that avoided justifying a forceful response by the other side contrib-
uted to the shared community value of minimizing higher order violence. The
result was creation of a legal fiction that states that were clearly party to a con-
flict, were not.
To some extent, this paradigm was illustrated by community reactions to
counter-terrorist operations. Consider Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the
1986 air strikes against terrorist and Libyan government facilities by US forces
in response to the bombing of the La Belle discothèque in Berlin. The Libyan
leader, Muammar el Qadhafi, had previously praised terrorist actions.
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151. Such as physical survival and security for individuals and the tangible or intangible objects
on which they rely, human dignity, social progress and quality of life, and “the right of peoples to
shape their own political community.” These aims derive from those expressed in the Preamble
to the UN Charter:
To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law
can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom.
U.N. CHARTER, pmbl. The final aim was articulated in W. Michael Reisman, Allocating
Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 26, 45 (Lori Damrosch & David J.
Scheffer eds., 1991).
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Moreover, in advance of the attacks the United States intercepted communi-
cations to the Libyan People’s Bureau in West Berlin containing an order to
attack Americans. Additional intercepts immediately preceding and following
the La Belle bombing provided further evidence of Libyan complicity.152
Despite Libya’s support of terrorism, international reaction to the US oper-
ation, which was justified on the basis of self-defense, was overwhelmingly
negative.153 Many of the United States’ closest allies were critical, with the ex-
ceptions of the United Kingdom and Israel. The General Assembly passed a
resolution condemning the action, while Secretary-General Javier Perez de
Cuellar issued a statement “deploring” the “military action by one member
state against another.”154 Viewed in the then-existing international security
context, this was an unsurprising reaction. If state sponsorship of terrorism (a
particularly ill-defined term given the bipolarity of the period) rose to the level
of an armed attack justifying a forceful response in self-defense, then, given
both sides’ propensity to support opponents of their foe, the risk of a super-
power affray grew.
However, the geopolitical context has changed dramatically in the last de-
cade. Today there is but one superpower. Additionally, any antagonism that
exists between it and other significant world players, such as Russia and
China, is unlikely to erupt into open conflict. On the contrary, in many cases
the former antagonists are cooperating against common threats, a trend illus-
trated by the recent creation of the NATO-Russia Council.155
Yet, as the likelihood of inter-state conflict receded, the relative impor-
tance of the terrorist threat grew correspondingly. For the major players on
the world scene, it was no longer attack by another state that dominated stra-
tegic risk assessment, but rather the spread of instability, particularly through
the mechanism of non-international armed conflict, and the related menace
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153. See Reisman, International Legal Responses, supra note 98, 33–34, for a detailed description of
the international reaction. See also Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 U.S. Airstrike on Iraq to
the 1986 Bombing of Libya: The New Interpretation of Article 51, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99
(1994).
154. Israelis Praise It While Arabs Vow to Avenge It, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 16, 1986, at A9.
155. The NATO-Russia Council, approved in May 2002, is specifically tasked with countering
terrorism. See Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member states and
the Russian Federation, May 28, 2002, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/
b020528e.htm (Jun. 18, 2002).
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of terrorism, either domestic or international. Not surprising, normative un-
derstandings shifted accordingly.
That shift was dramatically illustrated by the deafening silence, described
at the outset of this article, over the issue of the lawfulness of the US and UK
attacks of October 7th. Of course, some academic voices pointed to the nor-
mative faultlines in the operations, but academe was by no means united on
the subject. Media criticism was rare, as was that by important non-govern-
mental organizations. Most significantly, there was almost no state censure of
the actions; on the contrary, states scrambled to join the cause.
This reaction was a logical continuation of a trend evident in two earlier
post-Cold War responses to terrorism. In 1993, a plot to assassinate former
President George Bush during a visit to Kuwait was foiled. Investigation sug-
gested Iraqi government involvement. In response, the United States
launched cruise missiles against Iraqi intelligence facilities. President Clinton
justified the action in the following terms:
This Thursday, Attorney General Reno and Director of Central Intelligence
Woolsey gave me their findings. Based on their investigation there is compelling
evidence that there was, in fact, a plot to assassinate former President Bush and
that this plot, which included the use of a powerful bomb made in Iraq, was
directed and pursued by the Iraqi intelligence service.
These actions were directed against the Iraqi Government, which was
responsible for the assassination plot. Saddam Hussein has demonstrated
repeatedly that he will resort to terrorism or aggression if left unchecked. Our
intent was to target Iraq’s capacity to support violence against the United States
and other nations and to deter Saddam Hussein from supporting such outlaw
behavior in the future. Therefore, we directed our action against the facility
associated with Iraq’s support of terrorism, while making every effort to
minimize the loss of innocent life.156
Of course, Iraq is a unique case given that an international armed conflict
with the United States had occurred in 1991 (and arguably continues today).
Nevertheless, the international community generally supported the strikes, or
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156. President William Clinton, Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence
Headquarters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1180–81 (Jun. 26, 1993). For an excellent
analysis on the state of international law regarding counter-terrorism in the wake of the US
strikes, see Robert J. Beck and Anthony Clark Arend, “Don’t Tread On Us”: International Law and
Forcible State Responses To Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT’L L. J. 153 (1994). See also Robert F. Teplitz,
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at least muted its criticism thereof. Of the P-5, only China expressed concern.
By contrast, support was voiced by, inter alia, the United Kingdom, Israel,
Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea, as well as the three Islamic
states then sitting on the Security Council, Pakistan, Djibouti and Morocco.
Egypt, Jordan and Iran criticized the attack, but on the basis of the civilian ca-
sualties caused.157
What is normatively remarkable is that the attack was somewhat question-
able as a traditional exercise of self-defense, the legal basis asserted by the
United States. It was in response to a plot that had already been foiled; indeed,
some of those directly responsible for executing it were behind bars. Addi-
tionally, there was no assertion that this was but one phase in a continuing
campaign by the Iraqis against the United States. Interestingly, the Security
Council appeared more interested in the facts of the case, which it reportedly
found sufficient to establish Iraqi involvement, than in the legal sufficiency of
the US actions.158
A more viable argument legally would have been that an international
armed conflict was still in existence between the United States and Iraq,
punctuated only by a cease-fire agreement, the terms of which had been
breached by Iraqi complicity in the plot. Curiously, that argument never sur-
faced. Instead, Article 51 was the sole legal justification asserted, an assertion
that was relatively uncontested. It is also important to note that, aside from
the strict legal stylization, the strikes were characterized as deterrent in pur-
pose, a warning to Iraq to desist from any further involvement in acts of terror-
ism. This purpose has pervaded virtually every justification for striking back at
terrorists over the past two decades.
The relative lack of criticism is all the more striking when contrasted with
that generated by the 1986 attacks against Libya. Some 50 Americans were in-
jured and two died in the La Belle Disco attacks. Further, prior to the attacks
Qadhafi had threatened that the Libyans were “capable of exporting terrorism
to the heart of America,” a threat repeated on multiple occasions.159 There
was no reason at the time to believe the Libyans would desist in their support
of terrorism against the United States; indeed, such support continued after
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Evidence Convinces the U.N., TORONTO STAR, June 28, 1993, at A13.
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the strikes, most notably with the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie.160
Thus, the severity of the terrorist attack and the likelihood more were forth-
coming make the Libya case more egregious than the plot against George
Bush. Nevertheless, international reaction differed dramatically.
Further evidence of the trend came in 1998 in response to the bombings of
the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Almost 300 people, including
12 Americans, perished in the attacks, which were tied to Osama bin Laden
and al Qaeda. In response, the United States launched cruise missile attacks
against terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant
suspected of involvement in chemical weapons production in Sudan. On the
day they were conducted, President Clinton announced his rationale for or-
dering the attacks:
First, because we have convincing evidence these groups played the key role in
the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania; second, because these groups
have executed terrorist attacks against Americans in the past; third, because we
have compelling information that they were planning additional terrorist
attacks against our citizens and others with the inevitable collateral casualties
we saw so tragically in Africa; and fourth, because they are seeking to acquire
chemical weapons and other dangerous weapons.161
Formal legal justification for the actions came in the required notification
of the Security Council that actions in self-defense had been taken.
These attacks were carried out only after repeated efforts to convince the
Government of the Sudan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these
terrorist activities down and to cease their cooperation with the bin Laden
organization. That organization has issued a series of blatant warnings that
“strikes will continue from everywhere” against American targets, and we have
convincing evidence that further such attacks were in preparation from these
same terrorist facilities. The United States, therefore, had no choice but to use
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160. The accused bombers were tried in Her Majesty’s Advocate v. Abdelbaset ali Mohamed al
Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, Scot. High Court of Justiciary at Camp Zeist, Case No.
1475/99. Megrahi was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment in January 2001; the
Court accepted the allegation that he was a member of Libya’s Jamahariya Security Organization.
In March 2002, Megrahi’s appeal was denied. Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi v. Her
Majesty’s Advocate, Appeal Court, High Court of Justiciary, Appeal No: C104/01. Negotiations
over Libyan compensation for the victims’ families have been ongoing for some time. See, e.g.,
Rob Crilly, Libya Denies Offer of (Pounds) 1.8bn Deal for Lockerbie Families, THE HERALD
(Glasgow), May 30, 2002, at 2.
161. President William Clinton, Remarks on Departure for Washington, D.C., from Martha’s
Vineyard, Massachusetts, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1642 (Aug. 20, 1998).
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armed force to prevent these attacks from continuing. In doing so, the United
States has acted pursuant to the right of self defence confirmed by Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations. The targets struck, and the timing and
method of attack used, were carefully designed to minimize risks of collateral
damage to civilians and to comply with international law, including the rules of
necessity and proportionality.162
International reaction to the two strikes was telling. Although Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Pakistan,163 Russia and Yemen condemned them, Australia, France,
Germany, Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom were supportive.164 In other
words, support or condemnation tended to track political alignment with the
United States. More normatively significant is the difference in the reaction to
the two strikes. The League of Arab States’ Secretariat condemned the strikes
against the Sudanese pharmaceutical factory, but not those against the terror-
ist bases in Afghanistan.165 Similarly, Sudan, the Group of African States, the
Group of Islamic States and the League of Arab States individually asked the
Security Council to consider the attacks against the pharmaceutical plant and
send a fact-finding mission to Sudan, but did not do likewise vis-à-vis the
strikes into Afghanistan.166
The best explanation for the difference is revealed in the brouhaha that fol-
lowed the strikes on the Sudanese factory. Almost immediately questions be-
gan to surface in the press regarding the accuracy of US claims that the plant
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was tied to chemical weapon production. In the end, the United States never
made a convincing case that the plant was engaged in the activities alleged.167
Moreover, even if the assertions had been accurate, the causal relationship be-
tween the plant and the attacks against the embassies was indirect at best. By
contrast, little doubt existed that terrorists were operating from bases in Af-
ghanistan with the seeming acquiescence of the Taliban or that the organiza-
tion targeted was tied to the bombings.
The reaction of the politically relevant actors such as states, non-
governmental organizations, and the media in this case reflects a general sense
that it was not the fact that the United States struck back which caused con-
cern as much as it was that the United States “got it wrong” in the Sudanese
case. In other words, if a state is going to take the dramatic step of conducting
military operations against terrorists, it needs to have sufficient evidence of
the connection between the target and the act that was committed, as well as
a reasonable belief that future acts are on the horizon.
What is the relationship between these incidents and the law of self-
defense as it applies to international terrorism? As Professor Reisman has per-
ceptively noted, “law is not to be found exclusively in formal rules but in the
shared expectations of politically relevant actors about what is substantively
and procedurally right.”168 Though such New Haven School pronouncements
often evoke controversy, there can be little doubt that the received law—cus-
tomary, conventional and case law—is informed by state practice and the
practice of other politically relevant actors on the international scene. Their
normative expectations as to how law should foster shared community values
are determinative of international law’s vector. In the context of counter-
terrorist operations conducted in self-defense, a number of conclusions as to
possible criteria bearing on the international community’s assessment of law-
fulness can be suggested from both the legal analysis offered earlier and the
short discussion of the evolving international reaction to counter-terrorist
operations.
Armed attack. A community consensus now appears to exist that armed at-
tacks may be conducted by terrorist organizations. At the same time, such at-
tacks constitute violations of international and domestic criminal law. Thus,
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167. Tim Weiner & Steven Lee Myers, After the Attacks: The Overview, Flaws in the U.S. Account
Raise Questions on Strike in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, at A2 (Aug. 19, 1998).
168. W. Michael Reisman, The Raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections on its Lawfulness and
Implications, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 120, 121 (1994). He further notes “a prerequisite for appraisal of
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the target state may respond to them with armed force in self-defense and/or
engage in law enforcement activities. To amount to an armed attack, the
“scale and effects” must be “significant,” although in a series of related attacks
significance is a cumulative calculation. This is a somewhat ambiguous stan-
dard, but factors such as the nature and capabilities of the organization con-
ducting the attack, the extent of human injury and physical damage caused
(or likely to have been caused if the attack is foiled or otherwise unsuccessful),
the relation of the attack to previous attacks and the method and means used
to conduct it bear on the appraisal.
Necessity. For compliance with the necessity requirement of self-defense,
there must be a sound basis for believing that further attacks will be mounted
and that the use of armed force is needed to counter them. This requires the
absence of a reliable means other than force to counter the prospective at-
tacks. The relative success of any law enforcement efforts (or likelihood
thereof) will affect the extent to which resort to armed force is necessary. Sim-
ilarly, if self-defense operations involve crossing into another state’s territory,
that state must be unable or unwilling to prevent the terrorists from continu-
ing to threaten the victim state.
As an aside, the option of seeking Security Council action under Chapter
VII has no relation to the necessity assessment. Although it is sometimes as-
serted that states should turn to the Council for assistance if the opportunity
presents itself, Article 51 contains no such legal obligation.
Proportionality. Self-defense operations against terrorists and states in-
volved in terrorism are limited to the nature, targets, level of violence and lo-
cation required to defeat an on-going attack or, if that attack has ended,
prevent any further reasonably foreseeable attacks. That said, those who act
in self-defense should be sensitive to the other face of proportionality, its jus in
bello face.
Imminency. Self-defense may only be conducted against an attack that is
imminent or ongoing. An attack is imminent when the potential victim must
immediately act to defend itself and the potential aggressor has irrevocably
committed itself to attack. In the context of terrorism, this point may occur
well before the planned attack due to the difficulty of locating and tracking
terrorists. Imminency is not measured by the objective time differential be-
tween the act of self-defense and the attack it is meant to prevent, but instead
by the extent to which the self-defense occurred during the last window of
opportunity.
More significant are responses to on-going attacks. The acceptability of
viewing separate acts of terrorism conducted by the same organization (or
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closely related organizations acting in concert) as a single on-going attack ap-
pears clear in the aftermath of the response to 9/11. Thus, whereas Operation
EL DORADO CANYON was widely characterized as punitive in nature, the US
counter-terrorist strikes in 1993, 1998 and 2001 were generally seen as appro-
priately preventive. In other words, the understanding of armed attack has
evolved from one looking at particular operations in isolation, and asking
whether each is imminent or ongoing in and of itself, to one where terrorists
are viewed as conducting campaigns. Once it is established that an ongoing
campaign is underway, acts of self-defense are acceptable throughout its
course, so long as the purpose is actually to defeat the campaign. In this sense,
deterrent self-defense has become, or is at least in the process of becoming, ac-
cepted. As noted, almost all justifications, official and otherwise, of counter-
terrorist strikes cite the purpose of preventing and deterring future terrorism.
Purpose. The sole acceptable purpose for self-defense operations is to defeat
an on-going attack or prevent one that is imminent. The motivation cannot
be retribution, general deterrence (deterring terrorism generally vice deterring
specific acts and actors), punishment or any other motive. Of course, al-
though each of these may be the logical consequence of a defensive action or,
perhaps, a secondary goal, they are impermissible as the primary purpose of
the actions.
Conducting self-defense in another state. It is permissible to cross into the ter-
ritory of another state to conduct defensive counter-terrorist operations when
that state has granted consent to do so or when it is unable or unwilling to ef-
fectively prevent terrorist activities on its soil. In the latter two cases, a request
from the victim state to take the steps that are necessary must precede
nonconsensual entry into the country. Operations may only be conducted
against the terrorists and their assets; however, if the host state forcibly inter-
feres with them, then that state may have committed an armed attack against
the force carrying out the counter-terrorist actions.
Conducting self-defense against a state sponsor. The formal rules regarding the
extent of support to a terrorist organization necessary to attribute an armed
attack to a state appear to differ from the normative expectations of the global
community. Those rules require a high degree of control over a specific opera-
tion, such that the terrorist organization is sent by or on behalf of a state to
conduct the attack. Mere harboring does not suffice.
However, normative expectations are clearly in the process of rapid evolu-
tion. Seemingly authoritative articulations of the standard, such as that by the
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua, are increasingly out of step with
the times. Although no definitive conclusions can be drawn yet regarding the
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extent and nature of the relationship between the state and terrorist group
deemed sufficient to impute an armed attack, several factors seem to have in-
formed the community’s general support (or at least lack of criticism) for the
strikes against the Taliban. Of particular importance is the fact that the Secu-
rity Council had made repeated demands that the Taliban put an end to the
use of its territory by terrorists, all to no avail. The existence of these warnings
by an authoritative international body rendered the Taliban the masters of
their own fate. Refusal to cooperate even after the unthinkable happened on
September 11th, despite demands and an opportunity to do so, only served to
exacerbate their culpability.
Moreover, the terrorists being harbored were of a particularly nasty sort.
They had conducted multiple operations in the past that resulted in hundreds
of casualties, and had now mounted an attack in which the death toll was
measured in the thousands. Their attack also had global impact; financial re-
verberations were felt throughout the world economy, citizens of over 80
countries were killed, and a pervasive sense of fear infected millions. Clearly,
the scale and effects of al Qaeda’s attacks bore directly on the community’s as-
sessment of Taliban actions (or the lack thereof).
Additionally, the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban was ex-
tremely close, actually symbiotic in many ways. Although no evidence has
been released of direct complicity in the 9/11 attacks, it is difficult to imagine a
more cooperative host for al Qaeda than the Taliban, cooperation that was
the inevitable result of the Taliban’s own dependence on al Qaeda.
Finally, the Taliban were viewed as illegitimate in many ways. Only three
countries—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan—recog-
nized them as the proper government of Afghanistan, by no stretch of the
term could they be described as democratic and their human rights record was
horrendous.169 To describe the Taliban as internationally ostracized would be
an understatement. Thus, conducting assaults against them seemed to do less
violence to countervailing international law principles such as territorial in-
tegrity than would similar actions against other governments and states.
Drawing these strands together, relevant factors in assessing the lawfulness
of a response against a state sponsor include the severability (or lack thereof)
between it and the terrorist group; the frequency, source and timing of warn-
ings to desist from cooperation with the group; the scale and nature of the
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cooperation; the extent to which the state is perceived as generally law abid-
ing and legitimate or not; the inclusivity of the threat in terms of states threat-
ened; and the severity of the acts committed by the terrorist group with which
the state has chosen to associate itself. Further, it appears that self-defense
vis-à-vis state involvement (like that against the terrorists themselves) is
heading in deterrent directions. Although each determination will be fact-
specific, it is clear that the bar is being measurably lowered.
Evidence. As illustrated in the case of the 1998 strikes against the Sudanese
pharmaceutical plant, the international community expects states carrying
out counter-terrorist strikes to act only on the basis of reliable information.
The United States learned its lesson well; in the recent attacks, the United
States provided briefings on al Qaeda and Taliban activities to the Security
Council, North Atlantic Council and other intergovernmental organizations,
as well as numerous states bilaterally.
The incidents considered above highlight the core facts that need to be
demonstrated: that the target of the self-defense operations conducted the at-
tack, either directly or constructively, and that the self-defense complies with
the requirements of necessity, proportionality and imminency. A much more
difficult question is that of how heavy the burden of proof should be.
Because the issue at hand involves the most significant act of international
intercourse, the use of armed force, a high standard of proof is obviously re-
quired. A preponderance of the evidence standard (i.e., evidence that the fact
in issue is more likely than not) is clearly insufficient to justify acts of such im-
port. On the other hand, a beyond a reasonable doubt standard would prove
impractical in all but the rarest of cases. The shadowy world of international
terrorism simply does not lend itself to immediate access to credible informa-
tion. By this standard, states would almost never have sufficient evidence to
mount a timely and decisive response to a terrorist act.
Mary Ellen O’Connell has suggested a “clear and convincing” standard.170
Although acknowledging that no accepted standard exists, she draws on do-
mestic law evidentiary standards and an assortment of decisions by interna-
tional courts, including the Nicaragua case,171 as well as the work of other
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171. Professor O’Connell notes that the Court referred to the need for “sufficient proof” [at 437,
para. 101], which she argues equates by implication to convincing proof. Id. at 24.
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scholars.172 Her suggested standard is consistent with the US notification of
self-defense to the Security Council, in which the United States adopted a
“clear and compelling” evidentiary standard;173 this was also the verbiage used
to describe the evidence presented to the North Atlantic Council.174 Applica-
tion of such a standard, or an analogous one, meets the dual requirements of
practicality and rigor—practicality in the sense that an evidentiary burden
should not render a state paralyzed as it seeks the requisite quality of evidence,
but rigor in that the burden should be heavy enough to preclude states from
reacting precipitously to terrorist attacks. Ultimately, an adequacy assessment
will rest on the international community’s determination of whether a reason-
able international actor would have acted in self-defense on the basis of the
evidence in question. All such assessments are inherently subjective and
contextual.
Once a state possesses the requisite evidence must it disclose it? Professor
Jonathan Charney argues that it must.
To limit the use of force in international relations, which is the primary goal of
the United Nations Charter, there must be checks on its use in self-defense.
Disclosure to the international community of the basis for such action would
help to serve this purpose. The alleged credibility of conclusory statements by a
state’s leadership should not be a sufficient basis for actions in self-defense since
it would encourage abuse. When attacks on a state are so grave as to justify
actions in self-defense, the supporting evidence would normally be readily
available. Disclosure of that evidence should be required even if the state would
wish to claim that classified information would be disclosed. The use of force in
self-defense is limited to situations where the state is truly required to defend
itself from serious attack. In such situations, the state must carry the burden of
presenting evidence to support its actions, normally before these irreversible
and irreparable measures are taken.175
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Lobel, The Use of Force to respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24
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HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979) [the attack must be “clear, unambiguous, subject to
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173. US Letter, supra note 22.
174. Robertson statement, supra note 34.
175. Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comments: The Use of Force Against Terrorism and
International Law 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 835, 836 (2001).
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This is a noble proposal, but unfortunately an impractical one. In the vast
majority of cases, the information necessary to establish the material facts will
be extraordinarily sensitive. Releasing it may endanger the lives of human
sources, jeopardize on-going intelligence operations of use in targeting the ter-
rorists or foiling future attacks, surrender the element of surprise, and reveal
critical information regarding the extent to which the battlefield, and the en-
emy’s command and control, is transparent to the state engaged in self-
defense operations. An absolute disclosure standard is not one the interna-
tional community will ever adopt in the case of self-defense against terrorism.
A more reasonable standard would require disclosure to the extent practi-
cable in the circumstances. Professor Charney’s concern about abuse of the
right to self-defense is well founded; however, that concern must be balanced
against the need to be able to conduct self-defense, and otherwise safeguard
oneself from terrorists, effectively. Moreover, the situation is not always a
strict disclosure/no disclosure conundrum. For instance, it may serve both
purposes to disclose the necessary information in closed session, as was done
when the United States briefed its NATO allies. The subsequent support of
states that have received such briefings serves as a safeguard against abuse, al-
beit a less than perfect one. Additionally, it may be possible to disclose infor-
mation after the fact, as was done by the United States in 1997 regarding
Operation EL DORADO CANYON.176 Doing so will allow states to build a track
record of credibility in their claims, a particularly valuable safe-guard in those
cases where immediate disclosure is impossible.
Conclusion
It has been asked whether the attacks of September 11th ushered in a dra-
matically new era in international law. This article has suggested that in most
respects the law on the use of force has proven adequate vis-à-vis interna-
tional terrorism. Where it has not, the emerging normative expectations rep-
resent less a new era than the logical and constant evolution of the existing
legal system in the face of changing global realities. That evolution has re-
sulted in some degree of softening in the community understanding of when
self-defense is appropriate.
Such a softening is appropriate in the face of the new threat environment.
Terrorism today represents a particularly pernicious prospect. Unfortunately,
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176. See Bill Gertz, U.S. Intercepts from Libya Play Role in Berlin Bomb Trial, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
19, 1997, at A13. The United States provided intercepted communications gathered by the
National Security Agency.
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the attacks that occurred in September 2001 may represent only the tip of the
iceberg. Thousands of individuals trained under bin Laden are at large world-
wide.177 More ominously, the threat of terrorism using weapons of mass de-
struction looms ever larger. The normative system developed for state-on-
state conflict, in which the risk of super power confrontation was always pres-
ent, is predictably shifting to remain responsive to community values in the
face of the changing threat.
Consider the apparent relaxation in the requirements for attribution of an
armed attack. Although it may make striking at a state in self-defense more
acceptable, thereby heightening the likelihood of state-on-state conflict, it
may have just the opposite effect by serving as an effective deterrent to state
sponsorship without risking the higher order conflict that was the danger dur-
ing the Cold War. Similarly, characterizing terrorist attacks as part of a cam-
paign rather than a series of individual actions actually gives the state acting
in self-defense an opportunity to seek resolution of the situation without being
compelled to immediately resort to force lest the imminency pass. This per-
mits greater community involvement in the decision-process and greater op-
portunity to gather and assess evidence.
The final normative verdict on the US and coalition attacks against
al Qaeda and the Taliban is uncertain. The attacks against al Qaeda appear
novel, but consistent with the community expectations existing on Septem-
ber 10th. By contrast, the attacks against the Taliban represent a less than
crystalline glimpse of the direction in which the international law regarding
responses to terrorism may be heading. But given the existing security land-
scape, the vector appears positive.
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177. According to the Egyptian Minister of Interior, “as many as 80,000 people may have been
trained in Afghanistan under bin Laden.” 1 THE TERRORIST THREAT (no. 2), Apr. 2002, at 2.
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